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From 1869 to 1878 approximately fifty American military officers
were invited to Egypt by Khedive Ismail for the purpose of modernizing
the Egyptian army.

During that time the American officers led by General

Charles P. Stone designed a staff system for the Egyptian army and they
established a series of technical schools not only for the staff officers
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but for the rank and file as well.

In addition to the reorganization,

the American officers led exploratory expeditions into central Africa,
they refortified the Egyptian coastline and they built roads and lighthouses.

In conjunction with their expeditions, the officers produced

numerous territorial maps, hydrological maps, and assay reports.
Upon reviewing their efforts, however, it must be concluded that
the American officers failed in their mission to truly modernize the
Egyptian army.

Their failure stemmed from three interrelated obstacles

that finally coalesced at the Egyptian military defeat in Abyssinia.in
1875.

Th~

American officers had been unable to convince the traditional

military elite of the Egyptian army, the Turkish and Circassian pashas,
that the reorganization was necessary.

The pashas persisted in their

traditional roles while sabotaging the Am:rican efforts wherever possible.
The defeat came as a result of their disagreements.

Khedive Ismail, who

initially supported the American efforts was forced, ultimately, to back
hi~

pashas against the American policies due to his tenuous financial

position, which had been fully revealed after the Abyssinian defeat.

The

pashas were his only support against the impending European takeover of
his government.

With Isma.il's suspension of the Egyptian debt paynents

in April, 1876, the French and British bondholders effectively ruled
Egypt •. The Europeans had not approved of ·the American presence from the
peginning, and it was the European controlled Commission of Inquiry that
officially terminated the employment of the few remaining American of ficers in 1878.

3

After almost ten years of concentrated effort, the American
officers left the Egyptian army in virtually the sane condition as they
had found it.

The refortifications, roads, canals, and light houses

remained in Egypt, the Sudan, and Ethiopia as the only testament to the
American presence.

As technicians the Americans performed creditably,

but as military advisors they left much to be desired.
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The continuing development of a superior military technology has
played a significant role throughout the· two-hundred-year history of
the United States.

Equally significant to world history has been the

American efforts to share this technology with other nations.

As a

result, Am:rican military technology has often played an interesting
and important, if not always a productive role in the modernization
processes of developing countries throughout the world.

The purpose

of this paper is to describe and analyze on·e such attempt to share this
"Yankee ingenuity" with another nation during the nineteenth century.
li

Between 1869 and 1878 Khedive Ismail, the ambitious ruler. of Egypt,
employed approximately fifty American military officers to modernize
his army.
military

As graduates, for the most part, of the United States'
~cademies

these men had received a highly technical education

and as participants in the recent Civil War, they had been forced to
apply their knowledge.

The shrewd Khedive hoped to utilize this education

and experience within Egypt.

This relatively unknown story of the American

efforts to reorganize and modernize the Egyptian forces without the sponsorship of the United States government comes as a striking contrast to

---

.
(

i
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the increasingly imperialistic policies of nineteenth century Europe.
The following chapters are a reconstruction of the events that led to
the ·formation of an unofficial, American mission through its ultimate
dismissal almost ten years later.
Two related factors emerge from the available historical material
of the time period to he.lp explain the American-Egyptian relationship
during the third quarter of the nineteenth century.

The first and most

fundamental factor was the multi-faceted role of the Khedive himself.
Ismail was a man of unusually expansive vision and in his early career
he realized that a modern and efficient army would help him implement
some of his more ambitious dreams.

When he brought the Americans to

Egypt to reorganize and revitalize his arimd forces, Ismail guaranteed
his full support of the American officers' policies even when they came
in direct conflict with Egyptian military prerogatives and/or traditions.
However, Ismail was an absolute potentate in the best oriental

fashion~

Could he really afford such unconditional support for policies that were
bound to antagonize his traditional allies, the Circassian and Turkish
military officers?
The answer to that question lay beyond Ismail's personal control.
From the beginning of the Khedive's military adventures, the European
bankers, with their' growing interests in Egypt, were suspicious of
the Khedive's plans.
empire!

Did he intend to break away from the Ottoman

Was he planning his own African empire?

Or, would he even

go so far as to liberate the Suez Canal from European control if the

3

opportunity presented itself?

None of these options were acceptable

from the European point of view.

Moreover, Ismail could not have

afforded to underwrite his dreams even if the governments of Europe
had allowed such grandiose plans to materialize.
Egypt in the late nineteenth century, due to Isma.il's modernization
programs and his lavish lifestyle, was fast falling into the last stages
of bankruptcy to Europe.

Consequently the.British and French bondholders

along with their respective governments did not approve of the Khedive's
new and costly military enterprises.
the American officers

w~re

It is not surprizing to find that

among the first employees of the Egyptian

government to be dismissed when the British and French Conmission of
Inquiry began its fiscal reforms in an effort to save Egypt from bankruptcy.

Under such circumstances, Ismail needed all of the internal

strength he could muster to maintain his position as Khedive of Egypt.
When the final crisis came, Ismail had to rely upon his pashas as his
only iooans of support and dismiss his American officers.
The second important element in this Egyptian/American relationship
is the role of the American officers who agreed to go to Egypt with the
goal of modernizing the Egyptian army.

Modernization is a rather

nebulous term and the Americans were to find that their assigned duties
were often vague and open to various interpretations.

Those placed with-

in the technical sphere such as engineering projects or exploration and
mapping expeditions were usually quite successful.

Those men assigned

to organizational or staff duties found their modernization efforts con-

4

tinually thwarted by the traditional forces of.the Egyptian government
and society.

When the Am=rican officers were called upon to use their

own judgment on many sensitive, cultural issues, their bullheaded self-

assurance ofteri got in the way of arty solution.
An understanding of the religious and social mores of this Islamic
country, as well as a sensitivity to the status quo within traditional
Egyptian society was needed to fathom the often obscure responses and
outright opposition the American officers encountered.

Fresh from their

experiences in the Civil War, the American officers were among the finest
military technicians available; unfortunately, as human relations specialists, they left much to be desired.

But because of the ambitions of

the Egyptian Khedive, Americans participated in -an episode of Egyptian
history for almost a decade of the nineteenth century in attempting to
transform a traditional Egyptian society through modern technologies.

CHAPTER II

KHEDIVE ISMAIL 'S PLANS

By the second half of the nineteenth century, Egypt remained an
Ottoman province more in name than in reality.

In 1517 Selim I had

conquered Egypt and established Ottoman rule over the local Mamluk
dynasty.

However, as the Ottoman empire declined in Balkan Europe

and the Middle East over the following three hundred years, so diminished her control over Egypt.

Napoleon Bonaparte's invasion of Egypt

in 1798 and subsequent occupation to 1801 further demonstrated the
weakness of Ottoman authority in the province.

This brief interlude

was followed by the rise to power in 1806 of Muhannnad Ali, a Macedonian
soldier who had been sent with the Ottoman forces to rescue Egypt from
the French grip.

Under his leadership, the stagnating Egyptian econ-

omy was revived and the traditional Mamluk infrastructure of the
government was destroyed.

l
~

.

1

This allowed Muhammad Ali the leverage

1Although the Ottomans gave Egypt the formal administration of a
province with a Turkish governor, a military garrison, and an official
tax collextor, the remnants of the medieval Mamluk military households
retained much of their previous power and influence. As the Ottoman
authority declined, the Mamluk families proliferated, their power with
them. They were appointed governors of local provinces and they were
named commanders of special expeditionary forces outside of Egypt. They

7

required to further loosen the formal ties between the Sublime Porte
and its Egyptian province.
·In addition to these changes, Muhammad Ali reorganized the
Egyptian military system with the aid of his son Ibrahim and numerous
European military advisors, thus creating the means for carving out
an Egyptian empire within the confines of the weakening Ottoman empire.

'·

Although Muhammad Ali's primary imperial ambitions were directed towards
the four Ottoman pashaliks (governorships) in the Levant, his first
campaigns were fought to gain recognition as an emerging power within
the Ottoman empire.

2

His initial campaign for the control of Mecca

and Medina (the two holiest cities of Islam) was designed to please
the Ottoman Sultan Mahmud and to help him rid himself of his more
rebellious troops through attrition.

3

As a result of these campaigns

he needed to replenish· both his military ranks and his government's
- coffers.

His 1820 campaign to the Sudan appeared to be a solution to

both needs.

even appropriated the positions of commander of the treasury convoys
to Istanbul. Nevertheless, by 1798 the medieval Mamluk domination
of the equally backward Ottoman administration in Egypt meant little
when compared to the powers of the rapidly industrializing countries
of Western Europe.
2

Encyclopedia of Islam, 1937 ed., s.v. "Muhammad Ali."

3
Henry Dodwell, The Founder of Modern Egypt (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1931), p. 45.

8

The two-fold objectives of the Sudanese campaign were the
tion of manpower and appropriation of natural resources.

4

acquisi~

Muhammad

Ali intended to conscript the Sudanese men for service in his army.
Those not forced into military service often found themselves in the
domestic slavery system of Egypt, a dubious reprieve at best.

In

addition to its manpower the Sudan appeared to offer numerous commercial opportunities.

There were scattered rumors suggesting the exis-

tence of large gold mines, not to mention other valuable resources
such as cattle, ivory, and gum arabic.

5

Muhammad Ali hoped to tap

these riches to help facilitate his imperial ambitions elsewhere.
The objectives of his Sudanese venture were never fully ioot.
The Sudanese conscripts proved highly susceptable to Egyptian diseases

4 0n a more speculative level, there may have been a third objective in Muhammad Ali's Sudanese venture. Since pharonic times the
theory that the unity of the Nile valley was necessary for the survival
of any power in Egypt had existed. Because the sole Egyptian water
supply and consequently the lifeline of the Nile basin was this tremendous river, any interference with the Nile's sources would--be fatal
to Egypt's very existence. Whether or not the technology to divert
any part of the Nile existed among the tribes of central Abyssinia
and the Sudan is questionable; however, the belief had permeated the
minds of Egyptian rulers for centuries and.even contemporary Europeans
spoke of the possibility. Sir Samuel Bak.er, a reknowned explorer and
one time. Governor-General of the Sudan, beiieved that the Biblical
seven-year famine could be explained by a diversion of the Nile. He
eventually used his argument to help convince the Br~tish of the
importance of the· Sudan in relation to their maintenance of Egypt in
the late 1880's. This theory is fully discussed in William L. Langer,
The Dipolmacy of Imperialism (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1951), pp. 103-5.
5

John·Marlowe, Spoiling the Egyptians (NewYork:
Press, 1975), p. 128.

St. Martins

9

and they died in large numbers.

6

The few gold mines discovered were

void of the valuable mineral in any quantity.

However, a substantial

domestic slave trade did develop and some trade in ivory, feathers,
and gum arabic was established.
In spite of the minimal success of the campaign, Muhammad Ali
did not abandon his new possessions.

Under the 1841 settlement forced

upon him by the European powers after his second Syrian campaign, he
received title for life to the lands of Nubia, Darfur, Kordofan, and
Sennar as

par~ial

compensation for the land and concessions he had

been forced to relinquish in the Levant.

7

In the 1846 settlement,

Muhammad Ali received the lease for the ports of Suakin and Massawa
on the Red Sea.

However, this lease was not renegotiated by his

successor Abbas, so the ports were returned to Ottoman suzerainty
in 1849.

8

Thus, Muhammad Ali's efforts to acquire a foothold in the

African interior cane to a conclusion.
Due to the strength of his military machine, Muhammad Ali's

lega~y

to his successors was a virtually autonomous Egyptian empire within the
boundaries of the decaying Ottoman empire.

Although Muhammad Ali's

6Robert Collins and Robert L. Tignor, Egypt in the Sudan (Englewood
Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1967), p. 55.

7
M. Sabry, L'Empire Egyptien sous Ismail et L'Ingerence AngloFrancois (Paris: Librairie Orientaliste Paul Geuthner, 1933), p. 384.
8Marlowe, p. 128.
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reign spanned thirty five years, the many changes he forced upon his
army were never completely assimilated.

His immediate successors,

lulled by twenty years of peace, discontinued Muhammad Ali's modernization measures and

~he

ineffective condition.

Egyptian forces soon reverted to their previous
Thus when Ismail came to power in 1863 he

inherited this legacy of Egyptian autonomy and a backward army of
little military use.

Nevertheless, as second son of the great Egyptian

general Ibrahim Pasha and grandson of the dynamic Muhammad Ali, Ismail
exhibited the same qualities of ambition and vision so markedly demonstrated by his forebearers.
Unlike his illustrious father and grandfather, however,. Ismail
possessed a westernized education and an unabashed admiration for
European culture and technology.

In this respect Ismail differed from

Muhannnad Ali who had through experience developed a healthy skepticism
for the many "benefits" of European civilization.

It was this crucial

dif fe renc'e that set the character of Ismail' s reign in Egypt.

In order

to understand the American mission's role in Egypt it is necessary to
first delve deeper into the circumstances surrounding the Khedive,
himself.
In spite of his European habits and liberal opinions, Ismail spent
only two years of his education in Europe.

He attended the private

palace school of the royal family in Egypt during his early years
studying Arabic, Persian, and Turkish along with the traditional pri-

11

.

mary sub Jects.

9

Not until the age of sixteen did he leave for Paris

to further his studies.

There he attended an Egyptian educational

mission where he perfected his French and studied some moderri sciences
.

•

an d engineering.

10

Ismail returned to Egypt in 1848 to take his place

amidst the uncertain atmosphere of dynastic politics stennning from
his father's and grandfather's death within a year of each other.
During the years between his return from France in 1848 and his
acces8ion to the throne in 1863, Ismail maintained a low profile in
public life.

Due to the traditional Ottoman suspicion among heirs to

the throne, Ismail was forced to live in Constantinople for the reign
of his cousin, Abbas, from 1849-1854.

While residing in the Ottoman

capital, Ismail served Sultan Abdul Mejid as a member of the State
Judicial Council.
Said Pasha in 1854.

He returned to Egypt with the accession of his uncle
Although Ismail spent most of the eight year reign

of Said Pasha successfully managing his private estates, he did serve
in an official capacity for his· uncle when needed.

In 1855, Ismail

was sent on a diplomatic mission to the court of Napoleon and in 1861,
Said Pasha appointed him Sirdar (Commander in Chief of the Army) during

9 rn spite of the military tradition in his family, Ismail did
not receive a military education. General Charles P. Stone, Ismail 1 s
Chief of Staff, reports that as a child Ismail was present at his
father's second Syrian campaign. If he did accompany Ibrahim Pasha,
the observations of a nine-year-old boy are the closes~ Ismail seems
to have come to a military education.
lOEncyclopedia of Islam, New Edition, s.v. "Ismail Pasha," by
P. J. Vatikiotus.

12
11

a Sudanese rebellion.

Thus when Ismail came to the throne upon the

death of Said Pasha on January 18, 1863, his future appeared uncommonly
bright.

He had proven himself an efficient administrator with diplomatic

and military

service~

and his Europeanized education had provided the

new ruler with at least the facade of a liberal

~uler

in a modern age.

While Ismail's educational background may have differed substantially from his grandfather's, his ambitions were certainly as extensive.

He had inherited a reasonably concrete claim by historical and

imperial standards to the vast territories of central Africa.

Like

his grandfather, Ismail had numerous reasons of his own for re-establishing possession of this African territory.

In his employ was a

Swiss adventurer named Werner Munzinger who began writing memoranda
as early as 1855 extolling the virtues of the Sudan.

12

The merits

of Munzinger's ideas may have grown proportionately more advantageous
as Ismail's financial situation .grew more desparate.
In his "Observations sur la.Situation Economique du Soudan"
written in 1871, Munzinger wrote enthusiastically on all aspects of
the Sudan.

The rich soil, sprawling plains and plateaus, and· suffi-

cient rains were surely maant to support large cotton fields.

The

11Encyclopedia of Islam, New Edition, s.v. "Ismail Pasha, 11
Ismail's service as Sirdar was titular only, and while it may have
given him some understanding of the military administration in Cairo,
it should not be mistaken as substantial military experience.
12Frederick J. Cox, "Munzinger 's Observations on the Suda~, 18 71, 11
Sudan Notes and Records 33(1952), p. 189. Munzinger lived twenty years
along the Red Sea coast serving the Bri~ish, French, and finally the

r-- .
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commercial possibilities were infinite.

He claimed that one would dis-

cover abundant cattle, gum, hides, ghee and ostrich feathers, .. timber,
ivory, and gold as well. 13

The envisioned potential of the Sudan had

inflated tremendously since Muhannnad Ali's time.
went further in his scenarios.

However, Munzinger

He suggested plans for railroads,

sanitary measures, public works, and education to transform the Sudan
into an integral and profitable part of Egypt. 14

Ismail, who was a

dreamer and an imperial gambler at heart, could not help but be intrigued
by such a sweeping vision.

Impressed as he may have been by

~erner

Munzinger's advocacy of an Egyptian-Sudanese empire, there were other
factors to be considered.

How would the governments of Europe view

these plans?
The Middle.East political scene during the

enti~e

nineteenth

century was orchestrated by the major governments of Europe.

Ismail

knew this well from both his observations of his grandfather's difficulties dealing with the Europeans and through his own experience with
them.

In case prior dynastic claims and connnercial reasons might prove

insufficient

justifi~ation

for a· large-scaled Egyptian occupation of

the Sudan and possibly central Africa, Ismail prepared a third and

Khedive in different diplomatic, military, and connnercial capacities.
According to American opinion, Munzinger was an opportunist of the
first order, and not above carving his own personal empire out of
area. (Lockett papers.)
13 Ibid., pp. 193-195.
14 Ibid., p. 200.

14
compelling reason for his actions to convince the European powers not
to interfere with his plans.

The Sudan and surrounding areas were the

central marketing place of the thriving African slave trade.

15

Ismail

proposed to halt this rapacious and inhumane commerce under his rule.
Without debating the sincerity of his motives, a highly contraversial subject, he certainly recognized the effect that such a program
would have on the British.

The anti-slavery movement was strong in

Great Britain at that time, and Ismail was able to

se~ure

initial

British acceptance of his plans with this stance.

He reinforced his

intentions by engaging Sir Samuel Baker, a competent and energetic
Englishman, as his Governor-General charged with the task of destroying
the slave trade and organizing the territory.

16

With this action

Ismail prevented any itJJ1:00diate reaction in Europe; however, this did
not eliminate all of the obstacles in his way.
As ruler of the Ottoman province of Egypt, Ismail was still
answerable to the Sultan.

He had, however, found the path to Ottoman

acquiescence through financial renumeration.

Ismail and his agents

were ·able to successfully bribe those Ottoman officials needed to
secure a large number of favorable firmans (royal proclamation with

15Georges Douin, Histoire du Regne du Khedive Ismail, Tome III,
lre Partie (Rome: Societe Royale de Geographie d'Egypte, 1936), p. 478.
16Ib.id.

15
the force of law) from Sultan Abdul Aziz.

These firmans dealt with a

variety of Ottoman concessions in areas of hereditary rights, financial
obligations, treaty negotiating privileges, and most importantly for
his imperial ambitions, the size of the Egyptian military establishment.
If·Ismail intended to invade and 9ccupy such a large territory
as the Sudan and perhaps extend. his sovereignty as far south as Uganda,
he would need a substantial and well-organized army
Ali's~

similar to Muhammad

When he came to the throne, Ismail found the Egyptian forces

in complete disarray.

The size of the army had been

limit~d

to 18,000

man by the 1841 convention that Muhammad Ali had been obliged to accept.
However, the
death.

arm~

17

had seldom reached that strength after Muhanunad Ali's·

On his accession, Said Pasha had found the army reasonably well

equipped but he allowed and

~ven

encouraged lax disciplinary standards

that eventually destroyed the army as a functioning force.

18

In addition,

he reduced the size of the military by 8,000-10,000 men in order to fill

17

J. Carlisle McCoan, Egypt As It Is (London:
& Galpin, 1877), p. 99.
18

Cassell Petter

J. Heyworth-Dunne, An Introduction to the History of Education
in Modern Egypt (London: Luzac & Co., 1938), p. 314. Said Pasha had
a tendency to promJte Egyptian officers to high ranks, often at the
expence of their Turkish and Circassian counterparts. While this gave
new opportunities to native Egyptians, they were not always properly
trained for the job and this preference of Said's offended his Circassian and Turkish allies within the military organization.

16
the coryee labor ranks working on the Suez Canal.

19

This obviously

.
Ij.

had a debilitating effect upon what remained of the Muhammad Ali

;

military organization.

In short, the army that Ismail inherited in 1863 had reverted to
the traditional Otto~ military organization that 1Yh.ihammad. Ali had
tried to eliminate.

The "pasha system" not only survived but was

revived during the years following Muhammad Ali's death.

20

The system

was coordinated from the throne in the·, person of the Minister of War.
All orders to the army were directed by the Minister of War and his
seal was required before any action could or would be taken by his
subordinates.

In turn, with few exceptions, the entire army sent its

military documents to the Minister of War.

21

The inefficiency that

this kind of absolute .authority produced ·bordered on incredulity.
For example, the Minister of War often insisted on inspecting all of
the new recruits himself.

22

The men would be sent to his office in

19 Ibid.

When Said Pasha granted the Suez Canal concession to
Ferdinand deLesseps, he not only agreed to pay for nearly half of the
enterprise, he also agreed to supply the labor force free of charge
and to give large portions of land along side of the Canal to the
company. It was an expensive proposition for Egypt.
20

The phrase "pasha system" as it is used throughout this paper
refers to the traditional Ottoman military organization whereby each
individual commander functioned as an independent unit directly respons~ble to the Minister of War •.
2

1william W. Loring, A Confederate Soldier in Egypt (New York:
Dodd, Mead & Co., 1884), p. 357.
2

2william McE. Dye, Moslem Egypt and Christian Abyssinia· (New York:
Atkins and Prout, 1880; reprint ed., New York: Negro Universities Press,
19 6 9) ' .p. 17 0.

,17

1

the Citadel in Cairo to wait for his nod of approval and often, they
would have to return daily for weeks before the Minister would have
the time to give his assent.
Obviously the Minister could not at.tend to every military document
that arrived at his office.

Rather than appoint an official subordinate

to fill some of his duties, the Minister of War preferred to assign the
work·to his office staff.
authority of his office.

In this way he protected at least the nominal
Thus the office personnel, especially those

authorized to wield the Minister of War's seal, occupied a position of
considerable authority.

These civilian clerks, usually Copts, recog-

nized the advantages· of their position, and they worked steadily to
increase their influence. 23

Among the advantages of a position in the

Ministry of War was the baksheesh (bribes) for drawing the Minister of
War's attention to a specific project.
activity depended upon

~he

In such a system, where all

pronouncement of essentially one official,

efficiency and speed were at a minimum.
Reporting to the Minister of War were the individual pashas,
generally Circassian and Turkish generals.

These men were part of a

traditional military caste from which the Muhanunad Ali dynasty drew
its strength and allies.

These men were not only the military chiefs

of their divisions or battalions but they filled the positions of
quartermaster, commissary officer, paymaster, and transportation

23'rhe Copts had a strong tradition of education in the largely
illiterate society of the time. Hence, they generally served in the
administrative positions of government in Egypt as clerks and scribes.

18

officer as well.

24

In peace-time the pasha might have such administra-

tive duties as customs collector or tax farmer in addition to his
military duties.

25

The pashas, in effect, maintained absolute control

of the logistical requirements of their own battalions.

Any outside

interference by a general staff would have been considered trespassing
upon their traditional prerogatives and a gross impropriety.

Like

the Minister of War, the pashas were jealous of their powers and the
ubiquitous Coptic clerk in the service of the pasha could be found
connnanding the similar status as his counterpart in the Minister of
War's office.
The power of the clerk depended upon the personality and ambition
of his pasha.

If the colonel or general was illiterate, indolent, or

weak, a cunning clerk could control the battalion or division with his
own interests in mind.

If on the other hand, the pasha were a respon-

sible leader of the troops, the clerk could serve as his calculating
right ·hand.

With a satisfactory relationship established between them,

the military orders of the·connnand were eventually carried out, although
not in a particularly efficient or accountable manner.

26

24George B. McClellen, "A Winter on the Nile," Scribner's Monthly
13 (January, 1877), p. 373.
25 Dye, p. 71.
26

Dye, P• 169.
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At the bottom rung of this hierarchy was the conscripted Egyptian
peasant, the fellah.

All Egyptians were liable for conscription ex-

l

l ,

I

cepting the residents·· of Cairo· and Alexandria·,· who were exemp'ted from

I

the military draft by virtue of a chartered privilege.
quences of this policy are apparent.

Two conse-

Most noticeably, the Egyptian

army could include Muslims, Christians, and Jews alike.

This was a

striking contrast from traditional Ottoman policy which generally
limited the Turkish·army to Muslims alone.

The second consequence

was particularly unfortunate in that the agricultural worker, the
fellah, was the primary subject of the draft.

The countryside was

often stripped of its most valuable labor source and Egyptian agriculture suffered for this policy. 27
It was also possible to buy one's exemption from conscription.
The sheikhs and mudirs called upon to supply the draftees would
accept a bribe in place of a particular body.

They marely called

up one more fellah who could not pay the price. 28

There was no age

limit for service and the term of conscription was usually life unless
one could afford to buy a shortened term.

Military service was so

unpopular that it was common to see the new "recruits" brought to

27
McCoan, p. 101.
28

Dye, p. 56.
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camp chained together in pairs and self-mutilation was fairly common. 29
Consequently the Egyptian army was filled with soldiers forcibly conscripted, and lacking any incentive to do more than the bare minimum
of their assigned duties.

Such an army was not ready to serve within

Egyptian boundaries much less conquer an empire.
The final obstacle in the way of Khedive Ismail's imperial dreams
was Egypt's financial situation.
ited a tremendous public debt

tha~

On his accession in 1863 Ismail inher-

amounted to approximately

~

3,293,000,

an enormous commitment in the way of manpower and land rights to the
Suez Canal project, and a close relationship with France.
though not of his making, was legal and binding.

30

The debt,

The Suez Canal sit-

uation, however, was intolerable and Ismail intended to seek amelioration and reparation by renegotiating the Suez contract and he decided
that his close relationship with France would be the key to success.
Within two months of his accession, Ismail requested a review of
the contract signed by his predecessor.

He asserted that the large

amounts of land ceded to the Canal Company were· a violation of his
sovereignty and he objected to the corvee labor provided free of charge
as inhumane and tantamount to slavery.

Ismail allowed the dispute to

29

Raleigh E. Colston, "Modern Egypt and Its People," Journal of
the American Geographical Society of New York 19(1887), p. 143.
30

Ear~

of Cromer, Modern Egypt, vol. 1 (New York:

Co., 1908}, p. 11.

The MacMillan
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go to arbitration with his "special" friend, Napoleon III of France, as
the judge.

On January 30, 1866, Ismail learned what price his special

friendship had cost.

The stunning sum of 84 million francs had been

accessed for Ismail's efforts. 31 The Suez Canal settlement was only
the first financial defeat dealt by the European bondholders to Ismail;
many more were to come.
The leftover public debt and the expensive Suez Canal settlement
might have bankrupted the Egyptian treasury early in Ismail's reign
had it not been for the American Civil War.

The Union blockade of

the Confederate states meant the Egyptian long-fibered cotton was the
only quality cotton on the international market.

The dramatic rise

in the price of cotton saved Egypt from inmediate financial embarrass- ·
ment •.

In fact, income from this windfall allowed Ismail to invest in

more and varied projects thus creating even more debts to be paid at
a later date.

Unfortunately for the financial situation in Egypt,

the Civil War in America ended in 1865.

Once the war was over, American

cotton once again flooded the world market, and the previously inflated
price of cotton dropped quickly leaving Ismail perilously close to
financial disaster.

However, the day of reckoning was still a long

way off, for Ismail hoped to find a way out of his financial difficulties.

31

nouin, Toma_Premier,. pp. 194-98.
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While Ismaii's confidence in himself was unfailing, the European
governments' confidence in Ismail was waning, and they watched all of
his projects closely with growing consternatfon.

The British were

particularly distressed over· the rumors in 1869 that Ismail was secretly
purchasing large quantities of Remington rifles and other armaments
from the United States.

32

These speculations were followed by more

rumors that Ismail had hired twelve American officers to revamp and
• l"ize h"is army. 33
revita

The French were equally apprehensive, partially

because the French military mission led by Colonel Mircher which had
been sent to Egypt in 1864 on the request of Ismail had been recalled
to France in 1869.

34

Upon the arrival of the American officers in

Egypt, the French Government objected to their employm=nt.
said to have replied that the French

o~ficers

Ismail is

had been under the orders

of the French Minister of War; the American officers would be under

32Public Record Office, F.O. Archives, 65/800, St. Petersburg,
January 12, 1870. Buchanon to Clarendon, No. 14; and, Public Record
Office, F.O. Archives, 27/1802, May 13, 1870. Lyons to Clarendon,
No. 463. (As taken from the personal notes of Dr. Frederick J. Cox).
33Public Record Office, F.O. Archives, ~/1192, April 25, 1870.
Thornton to Clarendon, No. 168; and Public Record Office, F.O. Archives,
27/1802, May 13, 1870. Lyons to Clarendon, No. 462. (As taken from
the personal notes of Dr. Frederick J. Cox).
sabry, p. 3~~· The French officers were recalled by the French
Minister of War in response to the impending Franco-Prussian War of
1870. Colonel Chaille-Long implies, in one of his articles, that the
French departure specifically triggered the employi:rent of the American
officers. Charl.es Chaille-Long, "Princes of Egypt",_ Cosmopolitan· 2l(January, 1899), p. 260.
34
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his orders.

35

Ismail's response did not alleviate French concerns about

his ambitions at all.
In spite of the British and French protestations, Ismail did

employ a number of American officers to help reorganize his army.
Their arrival in Egypt and their subsequent assignments were a matter
of great interest and concern to the European observers.

The Khedive's

motives and plans for the future were not readily apparent in early
1870.

Would Ismail follow in Muhammad Ali's footsteps and threaten

the European control over the Ottoman empire?

The British and French

governmants could only wait and watch for the effects of the new
An:erican presence for the moioont.

35 Public Record Office, F.O. Archives, 78/2139, February 4, 1870.
Stanton to Clarendon, No. 20. (As taken from the personal notes of
Mr. Robert Hunter.)

CHAPTER III
ENTER THE AMERICANS

Although Ismail's decision to hire a number of American officers
to train his army must have startled many of the Khedive's European

observers, this action did not materialize entirely without warning.
The United States had come to Ismail's attention early in his reign.
It had been the American Civil War that caused the sharp rise in the
price of Egyptian cotton and the consequent increase in Egyptian prosperity.

On a less cordial note, Ismail experienced American dis-

pleasure in the form of consular appeals when he dispatched a contingent of Sudanese soldiers to aid the F.rench efforts to place Maxmillian,
the Archduke of Austria, on the throne in Mexico·:

1

In both cases,

the growing military proficiency of that far off nation was amply
demonstrated, and even Ismail, with his scant knowledge of military
affairs, watched the American progress.

2

1
United States Consular Despatches, vol. 3, .EGYPT:
Seward, desp. 26-29, January 9-February 3, 1863.

Thayer to

2 .
United States Consular Despatches, vol. 3, EGYPT: Thayer to
Seward, desp. 113, November 13, 1863.
Ismail watched the American Civil War ·from a distance, discussing the latest events with Consul General Thayer. He offered to sell
arms and annnunition to -the United States and he authorized the closure
of Egyptia~ ports to any Confederate ships that found their way to the
eastern Mediterranean.

25
There were three excellent reasons for selecting American officers as 9pp9sed to officers from Great Britain or from
pean country.

anothe~

Euro-

To begin with the American military men had just fought

in a war with the most technologically advanced weapons ever devised.
Such.experience and expertise would be an invaluable asset when training a newly reorganized and inexperienced army.

Secondly, the Ameri-

cans and their government did not have the financial ties with Egypt
that the European countries possessed.

Furthermore, Ismail may have

sensed a growing influence on the part of the United States in the
world.

He had watched the Americans intimidate Napoleon III of France

to the point that the emperor withdrew the French troops from Mexico
leaving the ill-fated Archduke M.axmillian to his ultimate defeat.
This kind of military influence used for political purposes fit in well
with Ismail's future plans.

The final reason for looking towards the

United States for military aid involved the willingness on the part of
ex-Confederate and Union army and naval officers to work in Egypt on
Ismail's terms.

These men would be subject to the Khedive's orders,

not the American Secretary of War or the American Consul-General in
Cairo.
The Americans' willingness to travel such a great distance to a
foreign country to serve as mercenaries stemmed from a variety of circumstances mostly due to their roles in the recently concluded Civil
War.

Those ioon who had fought valiantly for the Confederate cause

found themselves barred from further military service in the armed
forces of the United States.

In addition, most of their personal

-"' ,,!. .. ~
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wealth had disappeared along with their cause.

Soma of the officers

had been fortunate enough to find position as instructors in a number
of small southern colleges.

However, most of the former Confederate

officers were in immediate need of employment. Whatever their personal $ituations may have been, life during the reconstruction era
in the South was often unbearable for the proud ex-military men.
Consequently, most of the southerners were pleased to be back at
work in their chosen profession and some were distinctly relieved
to have left the American shores behind.

3

Despite their service on the victorious side in the war, many
of the Union military officers were in the s·ame position as their
southern counterparts.

A number of the officers had only a mediocre

military record to show for their wartime service and a career in
the armed forces was unlikely.

Even those men with reasonably sound

records had poor prospects because after the war the funds for the
military forces were drastically reduced.

Those allowed to continue

were faced with the dismal prospect of chasing Indians without the

3

Henry Derrick Letters, 1875-1878, in private possession, Derrick
to Derrick, July 26, 1875.
Derrick, aboard the steamer 11 Spain," writes to his wife "What a
relief to be rid-of that horrid rag called the stars and stripes which
floats over so much corruption and tyranny clad in the garb of Liberty,
and whose praises have been sung, ad nauseam, by so many blind patriots!
I must confess my spirits rose and my heart beat freely as if relieved
from the weight of some great incubus which has rested in it ever since
the great surrender at Appomattox, c. H. fell like a ball upon the lifeless South."
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necessary financial support from Washington.

The future of the

American army officer was discouraging, and it was not

that

surpri~ing

some of the officers accepted the opportunity to serve elsewhere.

4

Thus Ismail's search for military help came at a propitious time for
most of the men and the American officers were enthusiastic and ready
to serve the Khedive.
Just how and when Ismail caine upon the idea of actually employing American officers is still a matter for speculation.

Since Egypt

was technically a vassal state of the Ottoman Empire, Ismail's official
diplomatic contact with the United States was limited to the American
Consul-General in Alexandria.

The consular records show no evidence

that he ever sought to arrange the employment of officers through
that channel.

Instead, circumstantial evidence points to one man,

Thaddeus Mott, an American, as both the instigator and the initial
contact for Ismail's plans.

They apparently met in Constantinople in

1868 on one of Ismail's financial lobbying excursions to the Sultan's
5
capital.
This was the year prior to the removal of the French
military mission in Egypt.

Mott, recently returned from service in

the American Civil War, must have impressed the Khedive with his

4

U.

s.

Annual Reports of the Association of Graduates (West Point, NoY.:
Military Academy, 1926), p. 182.
Swilliam B.: Hesseltine and· Hazel c. Wolf., The Blue and Gray on the
University of.Chicago Press, 1961), p. 18.

~(Chicago::
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intimate knowledge of the recent conflict and his apparent competence
as a military officer..

It is likely the idea was born in Constantinople

because it materialized soon after their meeting.

Thaddeus Mott was in a unique position to encourage such an
enterprise.

His father, Dr. Valentine Mott, a world reknowned surgeon,

had operated on the Ottoman Sultan Abdul Mejid when in Constantinople
in 1836 on one of his many excursions to Europe.

6

Dr. Mott's success-

ful removal of a tumor from the Sultan's brain gained the doctor and
his family great favor in the Ottoman court.

Thaddeus's sister married

Blaque Bey the Ottoman envoy to Washington, D.C. further strengthening
the Mott family ties to the Ottoman court.

7

·Thaddeus Mott went on to

serve as an officer in the Union Army and he met a number of high
ranking officers in the course of the war.

Thus through his family

connections with the Ottoman court, Mott gained the confidence of the
Khedive; and through his military service, Mott was able to gain the
confidence of the officers who would be proffered positions in the
Egyptian army.
Whether or not Mott and Ismail·discussed a plan for employing
American army officers in 1868 in Constantinople has not been documented.

However, by early April, 1869, Mott arrived in Alexandria,

6
The National Cyclopedia of American Biography, Vol. 6 (New
York: James T. w. & Company, 1896), pp. 281-283.
7
Hesseltine, p. 18.
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Egypt.

8

On September 24, 1869, he was appointed as Chamberlain to the

Khedive with the rank of ferik (Major General).

9

Within two months

of that apppointm=nt, Mott was on his way to the United State·s to hire

former American military officers for the Khediyal service.
The tnan who· facilitated Mott's search for available officers was
none other than General William T. Sherman, Comna.nder-in-Chief of the
United States Army.

Certainly no man was in a better position to

unders·1.and the difficulties faced by his former colleagues on both
sides of the conflict, and his special interest in this project can
be inferred from the fact that he eventually recommended the majority
of the men employed by the Khedive.

While.his connection with the

recruitment can be documented, the channels he used in the early years
are somewhat obscure.

10

One account states that General Sherman

actually visited Egypt in 1869 and conferred directly with Ismail; however, the consular despatches do not verify this assertion.

11

8
The United States Consular Despatches, vol. 5, EGYPT:
Fish, desp. 152, April 14, 1869.

Further-

Hale to

9Pierre Crabites, Americans in the EgyPtian Army (London:
Rutledge & Sons, .Ltd., 1933), p. 8.

George

10
Virtually every officer who wrote about or left records of his
experience in Egypt mentions General Sherman's role as an advisor and/or
agent for the Khedive.. In additions to these individual references Gen.
Stone's correspondence with Gen. Sherman documents the time and energy
Sherman spent in locating. prospective officers for Egyptian service.
11

James M. Morgan, Recollections of a Rebel Reefer (Boston:
Houghton Mifflin Company, 1917), p. 266.
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more, the year of 1869.was a very busy one for the General because he
concluded his command of the Mississippi Division which spanned the
entire Mid-West from Eastern Ohio to the Rockies and from Texas to

i·
I

Canada, in St. Louis and moved to Washington, D.C. to become the
Connnander-in-Chief of the Army at the request of newly elected President Grant. 12

It seems that General Sherman did not visit Egypt until

early 1872 and by that time he was already fully involved recruiting
the American officers. 13
Upon his arrival in·the United States, Mott imnediately set to
work locating willing recruits for the Egyptian army.
less than three

m~nths

from the day he had joined the Egyptian ranks

himself, he had his first two contracts signed. 14
his in:nnediate

~uccess

By December 17,

have been alluded to:

Two factors for

the financial needs of

the American military officers at the time and the Sherman connection
which lent an air of respectability to· the offers.
a more intangible nature should be mentioned.

A third factor of

Mott told the first

group of Americans to be employed (about twenty in number) that they
would soon see military action:

the Khedive was going to fight to

12

Lloyd Lewis, Sherman: Fighting Prophet· (New York: Harcourt Brace
and Company, 1958), pp. 594-600; and James M. Merrill, William Tecumsah
Sherman (Chicago: Rand McNally & Company, 1971), pp. 328~342.
13william T. Sherman Papers, vol. 31, 1871-1872. Library of
Congress Archives, Stone to Sherman,·Cairo, January 27, 1872.
14

crabites, Americans, p. 8.
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lift the oppressive Ottoman yoke from his country's back.

15

The

officers, knowing very little about the political realities -of the
16
situation, took Mott at his word. - There is a certain idealistic
tone to the memoirs of those men who went to Egypt to wrest her from
the grips of tyranny.

Perhaps this fervor embodied the same hopes

and dreams of the·vanquished southerners and the less than illustrious
northerners transferred to a new cause.

In any event, Mott quickly

signed his first two recruits, General William Wing Loring and General
Henry H. Sibley, both former officers in the confederate army.

Mott

returned.with them to Egypt leaving his brother, Henry A. Mott, as his

. .
f uture contracts. 17
agent to negotiate
The contract.provisions were uniform, explicit, and reasonably
generous.

The men would receive pay equal to their counterparts of

the same grade in the United States Army for the year 1869.

18

The

15

charles Chaille-Long, "Princes of Egypt," Cosmopolitan 26
(January, 1899), p. 2~1.
16

Morgan~ p. 267. Captain Morgan reported that the Americans
were anxious to get to Egypt for fear that they would miss the first
confrontation. Upon arrival in Alexandria he was surprized to find
no preparations for war anywhere.
17

c~arles

Chaille-Long, My Life in Four Continents (London:
Hutchinson and Company, 1912), p. 16.
18
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contracts were for a five-year term and renewable if both parties
agreed at the end of the term.

In cases of illness, the officer

c~uld

resign and receive two months severance pay plus travel expenses

home~

or he could take a leave 0£ absence at half pay.

When sent on

expeditions or to war the officer would receive an additional onefifth of his pay and any additional expenses.

Should he be dismissed,

the officer

~ould

receive six months severance pay and a travel allow-

ance home.

In cases of death on the battlefield, pension terms for

the family were also provided.

In general the terms seemed quite

sufficient to meet the needs of the American officers.
In addition to the strictly

"bre~d

19

and butter" provisions of

the contracts, there were a number of legal and political aspects
that were important.

For example, the officer agreed that he would

"not under any event, be governed, controlled by or submit to any
order, law, mandate or proclamation made or issued by the Government
of the United States of America. · •.• "

The officer agreed to "make,

wage and vigorously prosecute any and all enemies • • • " of the Khedive.
However, should the enemy be the United States, the officers would
not be held to that condition.

20

A third clause waived "all claims

l9The United States Consular Despatches, vol. 7, EGYPT:
to Fish, ·desp. 112, July 10, 1873.
20ibid.

Beardsley
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of protection usually afforded to Americans by Consular and Diplomatic
agents of the United States.

1121

In addition to giving up their claims

to American diplomatic assistance, the officer agreed,:
that all legal questions and disputes of every nature
which may arise between the party of the second part
(the officers) and citizens or natives of Egypt shall
be adjudicated and dispose~ of by the tribunals of
justice in Egypt, and that the Government of the United
States and its Consul or consular agent shall not be
allowed in any manner to interfere with same. 22
Through this contract, Ismail avoided the uncontrollable situation
he had encountered with the French military mission.
The men began arriving in groups of twos and threes in early

1870.

Mott and his first officers, General William W. Loring and

General Henry H. Sibley, arrived on January 27, 1870. 23
officers arrived soon afterwards.

The other

The general procedure for the new

arrivals followed a predictable pattern.

The group would arrive in Alex-

andria and be mat by one of the already acclimatized Am=rican officers.
They would then be taken to Cairo and settled in a hotel.

Within hours a

21Egypt as a vassai state of the Ottoman Empire was subject
to the Capitulations, a series of laws that exempted Europeans from
the native court systems within the empire.
22Dye, p. 2.
23The United States Consular Despatches, vol. 4, EGYPT:
to Fish, desp. 194, January 27, 1870.

Hale
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tailor would arrive to take measurements for their new uniform called
a stambouli, which would arrive the next day.

Such haste in outfitting

was necessary in order that the men might be received by the Khedive as

soon as possible. The Khedive was very proud to have the American
officers in his army and he was always interested in meeting the men.
Colonel Charles Chaille-Long described the welcoming address he
received from the Khedive and it was probably typical of the greeting
those first Americans received:
I welcome you gentlemen to my country. I desire to express
to you my appreciation of your prompt response to my invitation.
I may say to you in absolute confidence that you are expected to
see active service very soon. Your experience with the late war
in the States in America, the lack of any selfish interest in
Egypt on the part of your country are the motives which suggested
Americans for the proposed service. You will encounter much
jealousy on the part of the native officers. I ask you to bear
it with patience and indulgence. If however it should become
insuppo~table, then you must not hesitate to come to me directly
for redress.· I count upon your discretion, devotion and zeal
to aid me in the establisluoont of the independence of Egypt. 24
It is not likely that these were the Khedive's exact words, especially
regarding, "the establish.m;nt of the independence of Egypt."

This

account was written some years later, but it is valuable because it
indicates how Chaille-Long perceived his role in the Egyptian army.
The personal assurance of the Khedive's full support, however, was
reported by most of the Americans who have left records of their exper-

24 chail.le-Long, Four Continents, pp. 31-32.
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iences in Egypt.

These assurances would become key factors in the

morale of this unofficial American military mission.
Within the first five month of 1870, twenty American officers

were hired and ready for work.

25

·The job of ma.king th.air assignments

and coordinating the American efforts fell to General Charles Pomeroy
Stone, who was appointed Chief of Staff on March 30, 1870.

26

This

position required not only supreme. organizational skills and understanding of military operations, but such human relations skills as
tact and the ability to communicate the rieeds of his men.

General

Stone possessed all of these qualities and under his leadership the
Americans creat'ed a general ·staff system, fortified the Egyptian coast,
reorganized the troops, opened military schools, explored and mapped
large areas of northeast Africa.
Stone's qualifications for the position as Ismail's Chief of
Staff were substantial.

He was an 1845 graduate of the United States

Military Academy at West ·P·oint.

Upon receiving his commission, Stone

was assigned an Assistant-Professorship of History, Geography, and
Ethics at the Academy.

These teaching experiences would be useful

25The United States Consular Despatches, vol. 6, EGYPT: Butler
to Fish, desp. 3, June 4, 1870. See appendix for list of officers.
26Pierre·crabites, Ismail the Maligned (London:
& Sons, Ltd., 1958), p. 96.
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in Egypt.

His second tour at Fort Monroe, Virginia, as an inspector

of an ammunition factory, would be help.ful as well.

Stone gained

practical. instruction in both the manufacture of ammunition'cind in the

actual handling of batteries of siege artillery. This assignment was
followed by wartime duty under General Winfield Scott at Vera Cruz
and Mexico City.

In July, 1848, Stone took a leave of absence to

visit Europe.

spent his first month in Paris perfecting his French,

He

and then he traveled throughout the continent to observe the various
armies of Europe.

Stone's command of French would serve him well in

Egypt, and·his familiarity with continental military practices no doubt
added depth to his experiences in the United States.

On his return,

Stone completed two tours in the San Francisco area and resigned in
1857 to try his. hand at a civilian career.

Important for his Egyptian

experience was his role in a scientific commission to survey and explore
·sonora, Mexico.

27

A geographer at heart, Stone took great pride in

the general· staff explorations of a similar nature in Africa.
General Stone ran afoul of the civilian authorities during the
Civil War.

He had reenlisted at the beginning of the conflict, and

he was responsible for the rapidly established fortification of
Washington, D. C.

However, when a company from his connnand led by

27Fitz-John Porter,_ Annual Reports of the Association of Graduates
(West Point~ N. Y.: U.S. Millitary Academy, 1887), pp. 41-44.
l·
l
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the popular, Colonel Edward D. Baker, a former Republican Senator and
close friend of President Lincoln, was ambushed and annihilated at
Ball's Bluff, Stone's problems began.

28

The Union forces had

a

dismal

record in the first years of the war and Congress was looking for a
scape goat.

They found one in General Stone.

Stone was investi-

gated for treason, and he was imprisoned for six months at Fort
Lafayette in the New York harbor.

All of this was done without an

open trial or court martial.

Stone's release was equally unheralded

and without full explanation.

Stone bore the injustice with dignity

and continued to serve in the Union army for most of the war until he
received an unannounced and unjustified demotion.

f~om

the United States Army for the last time.

With that he resigned

29

Part of the explanation for such arbitrary and unjust treatment
lay in the personality of General Stone himself.
the conservative military establishment.
charming and amiable gentlemen:

He was a. product of

While described as "a most

honest, brave and a good soldier,"

by his superiors, he was considered a stickler for petty rules ·and a
martinet by his soldiers.

30

He was a part of the military establish-

28

Colone 1 Baker was the. senator from Oregon for whom Baker
County is named.
· 29Harry Williams, "Investigation 1862," American Heritage
6(December, 1954), pp. 17-21.
30

George B. McClellen, McClellen's Own Story (New York:
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ment that believed that if a war was to be fought, it ought to be left
to the military.

These qualities did not endear him to his.own men,

who were quite willing to testify against Stone on hearsay evidence.

Nor did the Congress or the press appreciate his stiff, military
manner.

Essentially Stone was a capable and honest military officer

who lacked the natural political instincts which might have prevented
this fiasco.

However, Stone learned a great deal from his experience

and he used his acquired instinct daily as Chief of Staff for Ismail.
He worked quietly keeping in the background and in his first years
in Egypt few of the high officials were aware of his rising influence.

31

The first item on.Stone's agenda as Chief of Staff was to
assess the condition of the Khedive's armed forces.

The An:erican

officers were assigned to various tasks such as inspecting the condition of the coastal fortifications, armaments, and military organization, and.they sent their reports to General Stone in Cairo.

Stone

compiled a memorandum dated December 15, 1870, of the findings for
Ismail.32

He began by listing nine areas that he felt needed immediate

changes or improvem=nts.

Beginning with the most serious flaw, Stone

stated that more than one-third of the officer corps was illiterate
while over 90 percent of the rank and .file could neither read nor

31Morgan, p. 302.
32Abdin Archives, Periode Ismail·, doss. 50 /1, December 15,

1870.
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I
.

write their own names.

Said Pasha, Ismail's predecessor, had a tendency

to promote the uneducated officers over the educated man which increased
the

ineffic~ency

of the army.

officers developed, and there

A suspicion ridden atmosphere afil9ng the
was~·

much jealousy on the part of the

higher ranking but illiterate officers towards the younger, educated
men.

This atmosphere discouraged attempts to upgrade the literacy

level of the officers.

An irritating byproduct of this situation was

the substantial powers wielded by the literate, civilian clerks of
the officers.

These m=n were able to influence and control the offi-

cers who could not read the reports sent to headquarters.

Stone felt

. environmant
•
.
l erabl e. 33
was into
t h is
The second and third· items on General Stone's· list concerned the
deteriorated condition of the coastal defences and the complete absence
of a torpedo corps or signal service.

He

compared the crumbling condi-

tion of the Egyptian forts and their obsolete armaments to those of
the United States which Stone felt were inexcusably weak.

The inno-

vative use of torpedoes and submarines during the Civil War had convinced Stone that a modern defense system would be incomplete without
them.

In addition to these notes, Stone insisted that a secret code

.be adopted for future military communications. 34

33charles P. Stone,- "Military Affairs in Egypt," Military
Service Institution of the United States Journal ·5(1884), p. 168.
34Ibid.
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Likewise, items four through nine concerned various irregularities in the Egyptian military organization and their general weakness
wherever armaioonts were involved.

In point four Stone stressed Egypt's

need of an independent annnunition supply. Egypt's reliance on imported
ammunition from Europe had to be minimized.
absence of a staff system.

Item five reported the

A general staff had existed under Muhannnad

Ali, but it had been allowed to disappear and the current high ranking
officers had been

~rom.oted

to their present ranks without the exper-

ience of a general staff hierarchy.

The inspection of the Egyptian

armories and depots uncovered the sixth and seventh problems of Stone's
list.

The field artillery was obsolete and the military depots were

depleted of construction materials.
deliniation between commands.

Point eight noted insufficient

The American officers did not recognize

the village ·and tribal organization in effect within the various divisions and they suggested a clear' line of command complete with brigades,
platoon$, battalions, and companies be established.

Furthermore, Stone

reported that there was a need for a uniform drill procedure.

Each and

every commander seemed to have his own idea as to what was necessary
and correct.·

Stone's last point concerned the need for a separate pay

department, quartermaster department and connnissariat.

The Americans

were distressed to learn that each colonel would draw the monthly
salary for his regiment directly from the War Departm=nt's treasury
and the same procedure held true for procuring rations and ordnance

41
supplies.

35

The general disorganization was appalling to the American off icers' sense of order.· The possibilities for confusion and co·rruption

were ·infinite, and if they

we~e

going to train the Egyptian army for

action, substantial changes were in order.

Stone's report was· the

quintessential description of the Pasha system.

It is doubtful that

at that early date, he or any of the American officers fully comprehended the extensive pasha network that they were to confront.

The

intransigence of the.pashas revealed itself slowly, because they, like
, the Americans, did not fully comprehend the scope of the changes being
proposed.
General Stone had a solution for the nine problems presented to
the Khedive.

I

I

He believed that a full general staff system should be

introduced to the army and in a rather original report to Ismail,
Stone described the army and its functions in terms of the human body:

l

• • • the staff represents the nerves--starting from the head,
which represents the Comrila.nder-in-Chief, and extending through,
all the va~ious members. That, as the nerves communicate to
the brain the exact condition and wants of the members so the
staff communicates to the Commander-in-~hief the condition and
wants ~f even the smallest fraction of the army. And as the
nerves communicate the will of the brain to all the members of
the body, so the staff, in its various branches, communicates
the orders of the Connnander-in-Chief to· the different units of
the army, and provides for and watches over the execution of

35 stone, "Military Affairs," pp. 168-69.
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such orders. That a staff is of quite as much necessity to
an army as the nerves are necessary in the human body.36
The general staff, or Etat-Ma.jor as it was referred to,_ consisted
of six sections and a Cabinet of the Chief.

The First Section embodied

the same administrative duties as the Adjutant General in the United
States Army. 37 The Second Section supervised the collection and conservation of military history materials in a library established for that
purpose.

The geographical and military expeditions c.arried out by the

.A.marican officers were coordinated through the Third Section, while
the Fourth Sect-ion was responsible for the military justice system and
all inspections.

The supply duties of the army such as the quarter-

master, connnissary, and paymaster departments were consolidated in the
Fifth Section.

The only exceptions to this would be the supplies for

the engineer corps, the pontooniers, and the artillery which were to
be controlled by the Sixth Section.

This last section also covered

all ordnance including torpedoes and studies for coastal defense.

38

Ismail was delighted with Stone's complete and comprehensive

He fully agreed with the plan and ordered the establishment

report.

36 Ibid., p. 169.
37
38

Stone, "Military Affairs, 11 p. 169.

Abdin Archives, Periode Ismail, doss. 50/1, no date.
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of a full general staff.

39

General Stone was well organized, hard-

working, and efficient, the kind of man Ismail· wanted to reorganize
his army.

His early enthusiasm for the general staff plan mlist have

worried the Turkish and Circassian generals of his court.
officers could mean less power to share among them.

Additional

However, tradi-

tionally, changes came slowly to the war department; and because no
specific reasons for objections to the plan could yet be given, the
·reorganization by General Stone began in July, 1871, reasonably
unhindered.

40

The establishment of a full-fledged military staff system was
important to Stone; however, it was. not his only goal.

He dispatched

memoranda on new ideas almost weekly adding to Ismail's favorable
impression.

As a forn:er history professor, he was distinctly aware

of the lessons one could learn from history.

In his January 4, 1871

memorandum, Stone noted that of the three most recent invasions on
Egyptian soil, two were successful because the defenders did not
attack the invaders while they were landing their forces.

The one

successful defense occurred when the landing forces were met by a
barrage of fire, rather than waiting for the troops to reassemble
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Abdin Archives, Periode Ismail, doss. 50/1, July 16, 1871;
December 14, 1872; and. May 15,' 1873. The plans for a reorganization
spanned a two year period with the most comprehensive one dated May
15, 1873.
40 stone, "Military Affairs," p. 170.
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on land.

Stone used this example to illustrate the need for a railroad

system along the Mediterranean coast of Egypt from Damietta ··to Port Said •.
This would allow for the.rapid transportation of troops and.arms to
any spot along the coast-where an invading force threatened to land.
Stone also noted that the proposed railroad line would be short and
simple to build due to the flat nature of the delta land.

41

In conjunction with this plan, a number of American officers
were sent to.Alexandria to help improve the coastal defenses.

Colonel

Beverly Kennon, Jr., a former Confederate naval officer with a flair
for innovative engineering designs, was assigned to develop better
coastal fortifications.

Kennon, constructed a hidden, single gun fort

that literally dis.appeared into the sand.

With an ingenious device of

his own design, the guns could be raised to the surface, fired, and
retrieved out of· sight.
built.

42

Unfortunately only one of these forts was ever

The financial situation of the Khedive was growing steadily

.
. • i es. 43
worse an d t h e money went to more pressing
priorit

However, it

41Abdin Archives, Periode Ismail, doss. 50/4, January 4, 1871.
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2rrederick J. Cox, "The American Naval Expedition in Egypt,"
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charles Chaille-Long, "Princes of Egypt, 11 Cosmopolitan 26(1899),
p. 258. Colonel Chaille-Long suggests that Kennan's forts were not
built because of the jealousy of some of his compatriots. However,
the growing financial constrictions of the Khedive's government is
a far liklier reason.
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is worth noting that this particular fort was the only battery to survive uns.cathed the bombardment of Alexandria in 1884.
On a less spectacular note, the physical condition of .fhe already

existing.forts was 'improved. New earthen parapets, so· inches thick
were built to replace the old masonry at Aboukir, Rosetta, and

D~etta.

The old muzzle loading.hatteries were replaced as quickly as the new
guns arrived.

44

These improvements did not go unnoticed.

Feeling

threatened and uncertain as to what his ambitions vassal Ismail was
I

i

planning, Sultan Abdul Aziz forced the Khedive to dismantle several

l

l

I

of the improved fortifications and to ship the new cannons to Constan-

~

I

I

tinople. 45

l

were quite capable and that they might be a threat to the status quo.

It was obvious to all concerned that the American officers

A memorandum to the Khedive from Stone on February 7, 1871,
suggested that the "occupation of the Straits facing Ras Muhannnad,
as an outpost stronghold of Suez's Gulf," would be strategic.

This

position was to be fortified with two heavy batteries and connected
46
by a wireless to Suez and Kennah.
If these more conventional coastal defenses were not sufficient,

!

Stone had made pl;llls for a submarine defense program.

For this

tas~

i

I
I
I

44stone, "Military Affairs," p. 173.
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45cox, "Naval Mission," p. 175.
46Abdin Archives, Periode Ismail, doss. 50/4, February 7, 1871.
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he brought John O. Lay, a naval architect of Civil War repute, to Egypt
to design a torpedo system for the Alexandria harbor.

Lay spent most

of 1871 at Aboukir designing and testing his new device under the
~atchful

eyes of the local French consul and Turkish envoys. This

weapon was a torpedo suspension mine controlled through the use of
electrical cables by an operator on land. 47

The torpedo mechanism

was ordered from the United States and a school for training operators
was established at Rosetta.

This weapon, however, was never used to

protect Alexandria harbor as intended.

Prior to the British bombard-

ment of the harbor in 1884, a British employee at the Alexandria customs
house discovered the detonating device for the torpedo and he was able
to destroy it before the Egyptians could use the weapon. 48
Turning his attention to land defense, Stone's memorandum of
September 25, 1871, outlined a plan for using the extensive canal
system of the Delta as a possible defensive weapon.

This was a two-

part plan that not only discouraged invaders but helped improve the
upkeep of the canals.

The first part suggested that the silt collected

from the yearly dredging be used to build an embankment on one side
of the canal.

47
48

This would create dominating positions for defense on

cox, "Naval Mission," pp. 173-176.

Baron de - Kuse:t., .. An Englishman's Recollecti"ons of Egypt, 18631887 (London: John Lane, The Bodley Head, 1914), pp. 179-183.
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the otherwise level Delta.

The second part of the plan provided for

strategic innundations, if necessary, to stop an advancing enemy army.
This was a particularly promising plan because it would cost no additional money, 49
In conjunction with these defense plans, there was an imnediate
need to replenish the munitions and construction supplies of the
Egyptian army.

During the years between 1870 and 1876, the coastal

ports were supplied with new Armstrong guns and 200 rounds of ammunition
for each piece.

In addition, Krupp field guns and ammunition were

brought in large quantities and stored in depots.SO

Orders for

Remington rifles from the United States were made, and one of the
Khedive's American officers, Colonel Frank Reynolds, was sent to the
New York factory to inspect the shipments. 51

A powder mill and car-

tridge factory were constructed outside of Cairo.

The factory was

capable of putting out some 60,000 cartridges a day, thus making Egypt
practically independent of foreign supply.52

Colonel Thomas Rhett was

49Abdin Archives, Periode Ismail, doss. 50/4, September 25, 1871.
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in charge of the operation.

In addition to stockpiling munitions,

Stone saw the need for stockpiling coal.

The bituminous coal avail-

able in Egypt deteriorated in the air too quickly for storage.

Hence,

Stone suggested in his February 7, 1871 memorandum that- the Khedive
·order anthracite coal from the

Unite~.

Suez, Port Said, and Alexandria.

States and store it in Ismailia,

53

The defense programs represented only a part of Stone's activities.

He was equally anxious to improve the staff functions he had designed.
For example, the military library in 1870 consisted of three inaccurate
maps and a few books in Arabic on infantry tactics.

By 1876 the library

consisted of over 6,000 books and manuscripts in French, English, Italian,
German, Turkish, and Arabic of the best military books and periodicals
of Europe.

To facilitate the reports beginning to come in from explor-

ation and mapping expeditions, a printing office was established in
Cairo.

It not only printed these reports, but it issued a monthly

magazine in

Arab~c

on military matters and produced the engraved maps

that accompanied the reports. 54
In the interest

o~

Egyptian agriculture, Stone introduced a

system whereby the fellahin soldiers were able to obtain a leave of
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absence during planting and harvest seasons.

This privilege was

used as an incentive to encourage learning and good performances among
the men.

This action was instigated in an effort not only to improve

the morale of the fellahin but also to improve the agricultural production of the country.

As a practical measure it also relieved the

expenses of the War Department each spring and fall. 55
In late 1873 Ismail expressed his approval of General Stone's
work by placing the Ministry of Public Works under his dominion as
the Seventh Section.

56

Stone had attempted to locate a capable American

to serve as an advisor to the Minister of Public Works as early as
May, 1872.

In a letter to General Sherman, Stone described the Minis-

ter as a young,

inexperi-en~ed

and patient advisor.

57

prince who needed an older, experienced"

The right man could not be found immediately,

and Ismail grew impatient with the existing situation.

So the care of

the immense system of canals, both irrigation and navigational, fell
to the general staff.

This included the ongoing projects for the

improvement of the harbors of Alexandria and Suez.

Stone was prepared

55

Ibid., p. 173. Stone does not explain what would happen if
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for this assignment, and a number of American officers were sent on
survey expeditions under the auspices of the Public Works Section.
The Ottoman firman of 1873, among other things, gave Ismail the

right to enlarge his army lifting all previous restrictions. When the
news arrived in Cairo, St.one began the reorganization of the entire
military structure of the army.

There were to be five divisions:

one division of guard troops and four divisions of the

line~

Each

division was to consist of four regiments of infantry, two regiments of
cavalry, one regiment of artillery, and one battalion of engineers.

The

troops of the guard formed the reserve force of the army and those m=n
were allowed to return home after serving a set period of time.

A

regiment in the infantry consisted of four battalions of eight companies
with 100 men, or approximately 13,000 men in an infantry division.

A

regiment of cavalry consisted of six squadrons of 150 men each or approximately 2,500 men.
battalion.

No m=ntion was made of the size of an engineer

Using these figures one can compute the approximate size

of the planned Egyptian army at some 66,000 m:n, an awesome force by
Middle East standarqs.

Stone states that the fourth division was never

completed so that the army stood at about 60,000 men.

Supplementing

this substantial force was the Sudanese army of some 30,000 men and
their infinite source for recruitment.

58

. Hence, the Khedive's army,

58 stone, "Milltary Affairs," p. 172.
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at least in

the~ry,

was a formidable force in Middle Eastern politics.

Throughout the entire reign of Ismail, a series of exploratory
expeditions were sent to map the unknown areas of northeast Africa,

and oftan the officers would negotiate treaties of cooperation or
actual annexation of the territories for the Khedive.
the American officers excelled.

In this role,

Their treks across unknown and treach-

erous deserts, swamps, and mountains opened large areas to western view
for the first time.

General Stone was particularly pleased with their

scientific and geographical reports while Ismail was particularly gratified with their expansion of his territory.
Colonel Erastus Sparrow Purdy, a former Union officer from
fornia, proved to be an especially adept explorer.

Cali~

In his first expe-

dition in 1871, he mapped the regions between Cairo and Suez and Kenneh
on the Nile to Kossair on the Red Sea.

In early 1874 he was sent on a

reconnaissance of the Ababdieh and Bishareen deserts between Berber
on the Nile and Berenice on the Red Sea to see if a railroad would be
feasible.

His report stated there would be no problems except possibly

two. stretches lacking in water.

Between 1874-1876; Purdy along with

a fellow Amarican officer Colonel Alexander Mason, explored the upper
Nile to New Dongola then crossed westward to explore and map the route
to El-Fasher, the capital of Darfur.

There they were joined by their

fellow American, Colonel Henry G. Prout, and together they mapped much
of Darfur.

On that expedition it was discovered that the position of

53

El-Fasher was a full three degrees further west than previously mapped. 59
In later years Purdy served as military governor of Darfur.
Colonel Mason began his Egyptian career as a captain o! the

Khedival mail steamer that traveled between Alexandria and Constan60

tinople..

His first exploratory expedition was to map Fayoum and the

oasis of Siwa in western Egypt in 1872.

On his next two expeditions,

Mason accompanied Purdy on the Ababdieh and Bishareen reconnaissance
as well as the Sudanese expedition to Darfur.

Mason's final feat as

part of the American mission was the circumnavigation and survey of
Lake Albert Nyanza in Central Africa.

61

Mason remained in Egypt as

a civilian employee of Khedive Tewfiq after the dismissal of the
American mission.

He served as the governor of Massawa until the

city was given to the Italians in 1885.
Colonel Raleigh Colston, a forioor Confederate officer and chem-·
istry professor, was first assigned to the Staff College as an instructor.

However, he was soon transferred to the Third Section and sent on

j

II

mapping expeditions.

His first effort in 1873 was to explore and map

the ancient Roman road from Kenneh to Berenice.

He made geological

I

surveys and maps of the deserts between Kenneh and Berbera on the Red
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Sea;· in addition, Colonel Colston was a member of the
dition of early 1874.
Nile to Debbah.

Pu~dy/Mason

expe-

Between 1874-1876 Colston ascended the upper

During this expedition, he contracted a paralysis

and at one point he almost died.

However, he showed his phenominal

willpower by not relinquishing his connna.nd until Colonel Prout arrived
to take his place.
Mason and Purdy.

Prout journeyed from El Obeid to rendezvous with
He had been surveying the route between Suakin and

Berber when he received the order to relieve the suffering Colston.
Colonel Colston eventually returned to Cairo alive, carried on a hammock
strung between two camels.

62

Colonel Charles Chaille-Long had an equally exciting and unique
series of expeditions.

His first exploratory assignmant came in con-

junction with his assignmant as Chief of Staff for the British Colonel
Charles Gordon.

63

They ascended the White Nile in 1874 as far as

Gondokoro together.

From there Chaille-Long continued with a small

retinue to visit M'Tese, the King of Uganda.

The king agreed to sign

the friendship treaty brought by Chaille-Long from the Khedive.
the 1874-M'Tese mission, Chaille-Long

ascert~ined

On

the identity of the

White Nile as it merged with the Somerset River and he discovered Lake

62
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Ibrahim (later

ren~d

Lake Kioga).

In 1875 he led an expedition from

Lerdo into the country of Makraka-Niam Niams.

Chaille-Long!s last

expedition took him to the mouth of the Juba River on the African

coast in 1876.
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Colonel William H. ·ward, formerly a lieutenant in the Confederate
navy, worked with John Lay on the torpedo
his arrival in Egypt.

experi~nts

at Aboukir

af~er

Later, because of his linguistic abilities, Ward

served as an aide to General Sherman during his 1872 visit to Egypt.
In 1875 he surveyed the Greek island of Thasos, noting its economic,

strategic, and connnercial possibilities along with mapping the island's
harbors and land features.

This was followed by his trip accompanying

Chaille-Long down the coast of Africa the same year.

His hydraulic

survey of the harbor of Kismayµ added to the growing list of American
.
65
ac h ievements.

Sone of the American officers had barely arrived in Egypt when
they were sent on these exploratory and reconnaissance missions.

Colonel

Samuel Lockett, Lieutenant Colonel Henry Derrick, and Professor L. J.
Mitchell explored and mapped the region southwest of Massawa in 1876.
Lockett and Derrick had both been military engineers in the Confederate

64colston, "Stone Pasha," p. 49.
65Hesseltine, p. 260.
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army.

Colonel Charles I. Graves, another Confederate naval officer,

performed the last reconnaissance assigned by the Third Sect-ion.

He

surveyed and established the first lighthouse at Cape Guardafui at

the entrance to the Red Sea in 1878.

66

The sheer quantity of American

expeditions was impressive, but the results were the true test of the
men.
areas.

They contributed a vast store of knowledge to hitherto unknown
Ismail displayed his pleasure in their work hy awarding

numerous medals for their efforts.
Ismail's confidence in his American officers reached its peak in
early 1874.

The Americans had been in Egypt four years and most of the

plans put forth by General Stone had been put into at least partial
operation.

The Khedive must have felt the urge to try out his rejuve-

nated forces; and as if he wanted to be obliging, Ferdinand deLesseps,
the president of the new Suez

Can~l

Company, almost gave Ismail the

opportunity.
DeLesseps had found that the revenues from the ships passing
through the canal did not reach the expected levels, and he persuaded
the Board of Directors to change the method of taxation.

Rather than

accepting the net tonnage of a ship or tonnage by weight of the cargo,
deLesseps deqided to impose a tax on the gross tonnage of a ship.
meant 55 percent increases in revenues over the old rate.

Needless

to say, the uproar from the shipping companies, which were mostly
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British, was deafening.

Sultan Abdul Aziz appointed an international

connnission to deal with the matter in October, 1873.
that deLesseps had to discontinue his new taxes.

The results were

DeLesseps requested

at least a permanent surtax on the old tonnage rate, and when word of
the refusal arrived on April 11, 1874, he threatened to oppose the
passage through the canal of any ship that refused to pay his tax.
Furthermore, the telegraph cable would be cut,- bouys removed, lights
extinguished, and pilots would not be provided to guide the vessels
through the maze of lakes and canals that made up the Suez Canal. 67
Ismail watched the negotiations between the Porte and the Canal
Company carefully.

He fully expected a stalemate, and he saw the

perfect opportunity in this situation.

He imroodiately offered to

occupy the Canal for the Sultan, free of charge, using his new army.
The Sultan hesitated briefly, but when the final words of "no compromise"

fr~m

connnand.

deLesseps arrived_, the Khedive was _authorized to take

General Stone was immediately placed in command of the troops

and McKillop Pasha, a former British naval officer, took charge of the
naval contingent.

Stone organized the action and on April 23, one

battalion arrived at Port Said, Ismailia, and Suez to prevent any
attempts to sabbotage the canal and to operate the canal if need be.
DeLesseps was given until April 28, 1874, to comply with the

67Frederick J. Cox,. "The Suez Canal Incident of 1874," Cahiers
d'Histoire Egyptienne 4(0ctober, 1952), pp. 8-9.
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Sultan's command.

In a fit of arrogance, deLesseps had left for

Jerusalem disregarding all of the threats until he heard the- news of
General Stone's arrival in Port Said.

At that point deLessep·s realized

that the Sultan intended to enforce his will; he immediately returned
to Cairo and in an interview with Ismail on April 25, 1874, he made
his peace and consented to the Sultan's terms. 68
the keen disappointment of Ismail.
over the Suez Canal.

One can almost sense

He had almost been allowed to take

This would have given him new opportunities for

revenue and possibly even nullified his financial obligations to the
Canal Company.

As this was not to be, he was ordered by the Porte to

remove his troops imroodiately.

In spite of the setback, Ismail must

have received a certain amount of satisfaction for having called
deLesseps game.
In spite of the many successes credited to the American officers,
all was not well within the American mission.

Traces of the impending

dif.ficulties had been evident from the arrival of the first officers.
Khedive Ismail requested their forebearance, and he promised to rectify
any wrong done to them. ·Consequently the first unpleasant and/or
discouraging incidents were dismissed patiently.

The Americans felt

that their various achievements in the technical fields would soon earn
the respect of the Egyptian establishment that was so determined to

68
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resist them.

However, as the years went by and the harassment increased,

the American officers began to perceive the many faces of the "pasha
system."

The depth of their cultural differences was staggering.

CHAPTER IV

THE CONFLICT BETWEEN THE PASHAS AND THE AMERICANS
One of the Atoorican officers was quoted in the New York Times of
July 27', 1871, saying that the "Khedive treated his American
but his subordinates were undecorous and insulting at times."

off~cers

well

Had that

been the extent of their problems with the pashas their mission might
have succeeded.

But the American officers were on a collision course

with the Egyptian pashas from the start.
frustrating and sometimes rather amusing.
passed off as minor irritations.

The first incidents were usually
Their initial experiences were

The officers held their

grou~d

firmly

and refused to accept treatment they felt insulting or otherwise improper
't

for officers of their rank. - Now and then an officer would complain di•
rect~yto

the Khedive, and·his satisfaction was more than assured; oriental

punishments were sometimes disconcertingly harsh.

Neyertheless, the

Americans were reasonably content as long as they could see progress in
their work and they could have their views taken directly to the Khedive •
.Captain James M. Morgan, a brash young, form=r naval officer in the
Confederate navy, experienced his first confrontation on his first day in
Egypt.

He arrived in Alexandria with a party of Almricans and no one came

to meet them.

They did, however, receive word to report to Ali Bey, an
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official from some unknown bureau, the next morning.

The m=n, Morgan

among them,arrived promptly but they were left waiting for several hours.
Ali Bey finally made his appearance and he proceeded to inform· ·the men

that they were neither needed nor

~anted

in Egypt.

lle then singled out

young Mc;>rgan by informing him that he was too young for his rank and that
he must accept a lower position.
Already annoyed by the long delay, Morgan lashed out at Ali Bey in
English, telling him that he was employed by the Khedive and no minor
official was going to demote him.

Apparently the startled official had

some knowledge of English and he quickly backed down and informed the men
that arrangemants had been made for their transportation to Cairo on the
following day.

Prior to their departure, Morgan received a request from

Ali Bey to kindly forget the incident and not mention it to the Khedive.l
Properly mollified, Morgan took this incident as encouragement to always
stand up for what he perceived as a "gentleman's" rights.

Morgan's rela-

tively short Egyptian career was strewn with such incidents.
Not all incidents could be resolved by the American officers' actions
alone.

Colonel Chaille-Long was assigned to the 1st Division

o~

Infantry,

1st Corps to organize a staff service for the commanding General Halid
Pasha.

The pasha had never worked with a staff officer before and he did

not intend to either.

He saw Chaille-Long's presence as an infringemant

upon his power and prerogatives, and to make matters worse, . Chaille-Long 's
1James M. Morgan, Recollections of a Rebel Reefer (Boston:
Houghton Mifflin Company, 1917), p. 268.
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pompous manner and elaborate wardrobe of uniforms were highly offensive
to the pasha's sense of propriety.
less and meddlesome foreigner..

he was "subjected to every

Halid Pasha regarded him as a use-

As Chaille-Long recounts th

speci~s

experienc~_,

of annoyance on the part of Halid,

who not only refused to comply with the letter and the spirit of my
(Chaille-Long '_s) instruction but withheld my pay· during several months. rr 2
Eventually Chaille-Long could t·ake the insolence and withheld pay situation
of his commander no longer, and he requested an audience with Ismail.

It

was arranged and when Ismail heard Chaille-Long's tale of indignities,
he reacted immediately.

General Halid Pasha was reassigned to New

Dongola in the Sudan, a.city whose sole distinction was that few Egyptian officers ever returned from that assignnent .alive. 3

Like Morgan,

Chaille-Long felt that he received his ·retribution, if not a trifle.more
severe than he expected.
In the early years of the mission the Khedive's full support of his
,,

American officers was publicly demonstrated on a number of occasions.
Captain Morgan, once again, was the party involved in the following
incident.

One of the benefits of being stationed in Cairo was the

availability of free tickets to the various cultural events in the city.
As part of the spectacular opening ceremonies for the Suez Canal, Ismail
built a grand opera house. along with a number of theaters and other

2
charles Chaille-Long, My Life on Four Continents (London:
Hutchinson and Company, 1912), p. 53.
3Ibid.', p. 54.
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cultural attract·ions.

The American officers were delighted to partake

of the open admission provided to them by the Khedive.

On one such

occasion at the Theatre Francais, Ali Bey the Prefect of Police demanded

that Captain Morgan serve him a glass of water.

Both mortified and

angered by the menial task demanded of him, Morgan quickly obtained
the water and proceeded to toss it in the Prefect's face.

Furious, Ali

Bey dashed to the Khedive's box and related the incident.

To his hurai-

liation, the Khedive asked him:
"What did you do to provoke the American officer?". • • "I
requested him to give me a glass of water," replied the Prefect
of Police. "Did he give it to you?" queried Ismail Pasha.
''No, Your Highness, he threw the water in my face and slapped
m:." "Ali Bey," said his Sovereign, "I should have been disappointed had he not done so. I did not bring Americans here·
to wait on you or upon anybody else. You may consider yourself fortunate that he did not shoot you. Go now and ask
· his pardon and see that you do not insult another American
officer."4
Such public support of these Christian foreigners put the pashas on
their guard.

If they could not defeat them in open confrontation,

then they would have to work quietly around the Americans.
This line of ·offense was very effective as General Loring
quickly discovered.

After

~everal

months of inspecting the condition

of the army and reporting his findings to General Stone, Loring was
namad con:nna.nder of the 1st Army Corps stationed in Alexandria. 5

4

Chaille-Long, Four'Continents, pp. 17-18.

5 Ibid., p. 39.
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arrival at camp, he discovered that the military headquarters did not
have a guard unit.

He i.nmladiately requisitioned from Khalid· Pas.ha,

his second in command. ten soldiers for assignm=nt to guard.duty.

Khalid Pasha ha.d never felt the necessity of a ten-man ·guard for his
headquarters,- and he saw no reason to obey an order from a foreign
officer.

He bluntly informed General Loring that the corps could not

spare ten nEn for such ·a job •. Loring was furious; there were over
12,000 men in the corps.

The matter was referred to the Minister of

War who upheld the arguments of his fellow pasha.

6

General Loring's problems continued to grow.

Khalid Pasha would

not acknowledge the staff system imposed upon the corps.
insist upon conferring with the Minister of

Wa~

He would

on all matters,_ often

directing orders to the corps unbeknownst to General Loring,.the appointed
Commander-in-Chief.

Feeling the situation was beyond his control, Loring

addressed a letter directly to the Khedive, seconded by one from General
Stone, requesting_,a replacement for Khalid Pasha, preferably a "young,
ambitious, and educated general or colonel • • • ,J Whether or not Loring
ever received a replacement for his second in command is.not recorded.
However, the incident typified the American experience in Egypt.
General Stone was not blind to the passive resistance that his

6

Morgan, p. 297.

7
Abdin Archives, Periode Ismqil, doss. SO/l, June 17, 1871.
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reorganization plans and programs were receiving from the pashas. 'In
fact, he developed another plan that he felt would eventually override
their opposition.

Stone believed that a large part of the resistance

was due to the lack of proper education on the part of the military
officers, and he wanted this situation remedied.
to Ismail and argued his case convincingly.

He took this problem

In August of 1870 the Khedive

ordered that henceforth all promotions would be contingent upon whether
the officer or soldier could read and write.

8

This was a drastic mea-

sure and it might have fostered insurmountable resentment and resistance had it not been for the second part of Stone's plan.

Henceforward

one and a half hours a day were set aside for classes for the entire
army.

9

The reasoning behind this action was two-fold.

Stone felt that

the Coptic clerks of the illiterate officers had a stranglehold on
their chiefs.

If the army were to become efficient and accountable,

the clerk positions must be filled by

~ducated,

military men; men whose

interests lay with the army rather than solely with their family clan.
Never before had there been enough educated soldiers to fill the clerk
positions.

Stone's plan would produce a sufficient number of literate

8
charles P. Storte, "Military Affairs in Egypt," The Military
Service Institution of the United States Journal 5(1884), p. 171.
Stone felt .that the illiteracy problems was so important that it was
one of the first plans he submitt~d to Ismail.
9

Ibid.
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soldiers to permanently unseat the scheming, civilian clerks.

The

second consideration arose from the petty jealousy that separated
officers along educational lines.

As mentioned previously, ·a· number

of uneducated officers had risen to high ranks under the rule of Said
Pasha.

The·ir fear and distrust of the younger and educated officers

was understandable.

If, however, they could develop even a small

degree of literary competence and added self-confidence from Stone's
reforms, perhaps some of their suspicions would disappear.

This would

certainly help the overall morale of the officer corps, and more importantly,. it would no longer discourage the younger officers from continuing

their education.

The resulting educated, intelligent soldiers,

hopefully, would be capable of mastering the latest military technology
brought by the

~rican

officers.

A general rise in the . literacy skills of the armed forces would
have been a tremendous achievem::nt in itself, but General Stone wanted
more.

Under his leadership a wide variety of specialized schools were

established, most notable, the Staff College in Abbassiah.

It was

organized in much the same manner as West Point allowing for cultural
differences.

10

Many of the American officers were assigned to it at

one time or another as instructors of chemistry, engineering, geography
and other technical subjects.

10

The students chosen for the Staff College

stone, "Military Affairs," p. 171.
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were considered the brightest graduates of the military preparatory
schools.

They were to continue their education for an additional year

while the less industrious students were assigned directly to·· military.

duty. The students of the Staff College were to receive the same pay
as their former classmates and after the extra twelve months of studies,
they too would enter the mili~ary service as sub-lieutenants. 11
In addition to the Staff College, a number of specialized schools
were established.
officers and

There was an artillery school, where both junior

~on-commissioned

officers learned the fundamentals of

artillery warfare along with the care and functions of the newly imported

.
12
nu.·1·itary equipment.

A school to train men in the use of the new sub-

marine equipmant was opened at Rosetta.

A special school: to help

establish uniform drill me_asures was opened at the Citadel in Cairo.
One sergeant and one corporal from every company in the army were.chosen
to attend the course.

They for100d two model battalions which were

instructed in the fundamentals of the newly established drills, rules,
and regulations of the Egyptian army.

After their one-year course,

which also included instruction in the basic educational skills, the

11william McE. Dye, Moslem Egypt and Christian Abyssinia (New
York: Atkins and Prout, 1880; reprint ed., New York: Negro Univer~
sity Press, 1969), p. 71.
12

stone, "Military Affairs," p. 173.
locatio~ of this training school.

Stone does not mention the

--
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men returned to their former companies to impart their knowledge to
their fellow soldiers.
next year's class.

New men were then sent to Cairo to fill the

In this way, a uniform drill was to

to all the regiments, battalions, and companies in the army.

13

An interesting side effect developed from the battalion school.
The fellahin assigned to this course in Cairo brought their families

. h t hem. 14
wit

When General Stone discovered that the man were

br~nging

their sons to class with them, he decided that this unexpected dedication ought to be utilized.·

He suggested to the Khedive that a spe-

cial school for the sons of the non-commi.ssioneq officers attending
the battalion school be established.

Ismail, who.was very concerned

with education, gladly obliged, and the school was opened in 1874.15
In addition to the education of these boys, Stone felt that this program should be considered a special right for the conscripted fellahin
who achieved the battalion school.

The fellahin were afforded precious

few advantages for their military services and this was a good opportunity to improve their lot.
The results of this massive military education program were
fairly inmadiate and dramatic.

Stone reports that by 1873 "fully

13Ibid., p. 172.
14 Ibid.' p. 173.

15

J. Heyworth-Dunne, An Introduction to the History of Education
in Modern EgYJ)t (London: Luzac & Co., 1938), p. 350.
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seventy five percent of the rank and file of the army

cou~d

read and

write, and knew more or less of arithmetic and the geography-of Africa. 1116
The Staff College_graduates showed promise as well.

duated twenty young lieutenants capable of

drawin~

In 1873' they gra-_
maps and in filling

some of .the engineering positions formerly held by Europeans.

17

This

had the effect of lessening some of the technological dependence of
Egypt upon the Europeans, and it saved the Khedive money in salaries
since a native officer could work at a salary a fraction of what a
European engineer commanded.

In spite of the seeming success of the

educational process, serious problems still developed.

The pashas

were not to be outdone by a few school teachers.
The pashas seemed to instinctively recoil from all of this
American activity.

Their actions were designed to stall or at least

slow down the American projects.

Keeping the example of Halid Pasha's

transfer to New Dongola in mind, the Circassian and Turkish pashas
moved carefully but decisively.

The American officers assigned to

·fill a staff function under a pasha found
occupy himself.

ve~

little with which to

The pasha would continue to run his organization as

he had in the past.

Not a few Americans found themselves sitting

around in the local coffee houses catching up on the latest court

16 stone, "Military Affairs," p. 171.
17william T. Sherman Papers, vol. 36, 1873-1874, Library of
Congress Archives, Stone to Sherman, Cairo, December 18, 1873.
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gossip.

18

The only advantage the pasha could·see in the intruding

staff officer was the prestige he might gain by having one of the
Khedive's American officers under his command.

the Connnanding General- of

th~

General Ratib.Pasha,

Army, ordarad one of his American staff

officers to appear in full dress uniform at the home of a French
actress with whom he was intrigued.

The staff officer was no less

than the indomitable Captain Morgan, and naturally, he refused to obey
the order, to the consternation of his comma.nder.

19

In general, the

pashas disliked and distrusted the American staff officers even if
they did appreciate their decorative value.
The Minister of War was of the same opinion.

As General Loring

described him, "the Minister of War, though extreirely amiable, looked
upon the interference of the staff as an infringeirent of his rights
and dignity, and a deprivation of a certain share of prestige. 1120
The Minister of War continued his practice of issuing all orders
directly to the comnanding officers with the exception of the Americans,
and the commanding officers continued to correspond directly with the
Minister.

The effect of this dichotomy of wills was that the Minister

18
Morgan, p. 274.

19

Ibid., p. 301.

20
william W. Loring, A Confederate Soldier in Egypt (New York:
Dodd, Mead & Company, 1884), p. 358.
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of War controlled the bulk of the army, and General Stone and his
general staff functioned as an isolated unit rather than the·"nerve
system" of the army.

Colonel Dye suggested that General Stone may

have .felt he could convince Prince Hussein, the young Minister 0£
War, that the general staff added to his prestige rather than detracted
from his position, but Dye concluded that he was unsuccessful.

21

The Americans also found that some of -their most important reforms were rescinded and some ideas were never instituted.

The Staff

College had been established as a reward for those officers who proved
themselves as aspiring students.

Their extra year of studies was to

be considered a distinct advantage in one's military career.

Upon

graduation, the student entered the army at the same rank as his former classmates.

Unfortunately, this system did not last long.

The

measure was repealed and the brighter students lost a year of seniority
for their efforts.

Furthermore, they found their reception by the pashas

restrained when they did enter the line. 22

The reality of this system

did not encourage good scholarship and the general staff suffered for
its loss.
~ricans

T~e

traditional pashas had other successes as well.

.

had requested but never obtained a three-year draft.

The

23

21 Dye, p. 74.
22

Pierre Crabites, Americans in the Egyptian Army (London:
George Rutledge & Sons, Ltd., 1933), p. 48. Although there were
several referen~es to this reversal, no specific date was given.
23Dye , p • 5 7.
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That would have limite.d the baksheesh the pashas procured from the
frequent call for recruits.

The road to military reform was-- more

difficult than the Americans had imagined.

Outside of Sections Two and Three., the military history and
exploratory sections, the general staff that Stone set up existed
mostly on paper.

Officers might be

as~igned

to take care of the

quartermaster or ordnance duties, but they seldom exercised any real
authority.

The native officers, once again, insisted upon taking

charge and comnunicating directly with the Minister of War.

In some

instances the pasha was quite efficient and accountable, as in the case
of Effletoun Pasha who controlled the ordnance department, independent
of the general staff.

24

·However, more often than not,. the military

functions continued in the same haphazard fashion the Americans had
found on their arrival in Egypt.
In general, the Americans were not put in direct command of the
troops, and in consequence, the .army lost many of the benefits of
their experience and knowledge.

The pashas probably appreciated this

policy but in this case it was not entirely due to their objections.
In the early years of the American presence, General Stone assigned
several officers as commanders· but only for a few days.
Lori~g's

In General

case, while he did remain in command of the 1st Corps in

24Ibid.' p. 78.
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Alexandria for soma five years, he possessed only the semblance of

.

aut hority.

25

The reason for Stone's reticence probably stemm=d from his ex-

·perience with Colonel Walter H. Jennifer, a former cavalry officer in
the Confederate army.
cavalry battalion.

Jennifer was assigned as commander of a bedouin

The beduoins have been reknowned for their horse-

menship throughout the ages, and they hardly needed instructions from
an American officer.

However, in addition to their superb horsemen-

ship, the bedouins have been known for a certain independence of will,
or as Colonel Jennifer saw it, pure insubordination and unruliness.
The combination of a southern officer and the desert bedouins could
not last long, and seeing the hopelessness of the situation, Stone
relieved Jennifer of his duties.

Unfortunately, Jennifer was suf-

fering from a severe case of culture shock and he never adjusted to
life in Egypt.

He resigned after one year's service.

Stone prevented

further confrontations of this nature by limiting the direct contact
between his American officers and the natives.

26

These discreet but nonetheless debilitating conflicts between
the traditional Turkish and Circassian officers and the Americans
should have been halted by Ismail, as the ultimate Commander-in-Chief

25
26

Dye, p. 77.

willi~m

B. Hesseltine and Hazel Co Wolf, !he Blue and Gray on
the Nile (Chicago: Unive~sity of Chicago Press), p. 82.
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of the army.

However,-by 1878, the absolute support Ismail had guar-

anteed the Americans had begun to diminish.

There were a number of

teaBona for this gradual reversal. Foremost among them

was that

Ismail's chronic financial woes had taken a turn for the worse.

The

European bondholders held the upper hand and Ismail could not afford
to alienate those few traditional groups that still supported him,
particularly his miliLary pashas.

Technically, the Muhammad Ali

dynasty was Turkish not Egyptian; consequently, Ismail was a foreigner
in his own country.

Should the Europeans want him deposed, it was not

likely the overtaxed, overworked, and over-conscripted Egyptian fellah
would be sympathetic to his cause.

Thus Ismail was forced to cultivate

his fellow Turks as his only loyal, popular support.
In addition

t~

his growing financial plight, Ismail had not

been trained as a military leader.

It is doubtful that he fully under-

stood the necessity of a clear line of command in the American reorganization plans.

It would have been easy for Ismail to agree to a

new regulation requested by General Stone one day and award some special
privilege that directly violated the new regulation to one of his
Turkish generals the next day.
the contradiction.
should· be tIEntioned·.

Furthermore, Ismail probably never saw

An additional element that colored the situation
The large amounts of sheer self-serving flattery

showered on the Khedive by the pashas and the continual stream of
baksheesh were almost more than the Americans could bear.

How impor-

tant this may have been is a moot question, but it certainly irritated

1i!'
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the American officers.

Many felt that nothing would ever be achieved

without baksheesh, but they refused to stoop to such a custom and they
maintained their own Americans standards of honor throughout their
stay in Egypt.

27

If these problems, although not entirely of their own making,
were not enough, the Anerican officers managed to create a number of
their own difficulties.

One habit, often tolerated in the United States

but absolutely unacceptable in Muslim Egypt, was the public consumption
of alcohol.

This offense was taken unusually hard since the Qur'an, the

.holy book of Islam, expressly forbids the use of alcohol.
there were very few serious cases.

Fortunately,

However, when problems arose, they

created a very poor impression among the natives.

General Henry Sibley

one of the first officers to arrive in Egypt, served as a particularly
poor example of American conduct.

His drinking problem had obviously

developed long before he arrived in Egypt.

However, the frequency of

his drinking bouts and his consequent incompetance soon became too
severe for the Egyptians and even his fellow Americans to disregard.
He was discharged ·in 1873 for a "physical disability. 11

28

A similar

case involved Major D. G. White, formerly of the Confederate army.
Described by one of his fellow officers as a man of little brains and

27

28

Dye, p. 72.

Hesseltine, p. 113.
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less capacity, White managed to over imbibe before reporting to work
each morning.

He had volunteered for the Egyptian service and appar-

ently General Mott had not checked his record closely before enlisting

his services. Ultimately, White deserted in December, 187s.

29

Such

debauchery was embarrassing to the Am=rican reputation.
A problem far more prevalent among the Americans was their seeming
inability to live within their means.

There are numerous cases where

the local merchants and landlords took an officer to court over his
indebtedness.

Not surprisingly, General ·Sibley was one of the most

frequent offenders.

On his departure from Egypt he left unpaid bills

on everything imaginable from broken and damaged furniture, smashed
glasses and dishes, liquors and cheeses to gold mounted coral studs,
gold epaulettes, postage· stamps, and books not to mention his rent.
Colonel Alexander Reynolds, one of the many West Point officers who
had fought with the Confederate army, had similar debts.

His bills

ranged from clothing, books and wine to groceries, medicine, and
even a contribution to the memorial fund for the recently deceased
American Consul General R. Beardsl?.y.

Colonel Reynolds' affairs had

to be untangled by the American Consul in Alexandria after he died
there in 1876. 30

29
30

Ibid., p. 118.
Hesseltine, p. 114.
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A large number of the debt problems concerned rent and uniform
bills.

Major Cornelius Hunt, a former master's mate in the Confederate

navy, brought his wife to Egypt and rented a furnished house in Ramleh,

a fashionable suburb of Alexandria. He not only refused to sign a contract but he also failed to pay the entire sum of rent each month and
then tampered with the receipts to show full
sent to the

~rican

pa~nt.

Consul for adjudication.

31

His case was

Unfortunately, Major

Hunt died of a fall from his horse in 1873 with his case still pending.
This financially irresponsible attitude towards native merchants and
landlords did not win many friends among the Egyptians.
\

Colonel Purdy had his problems as well.
for room and board at the Khedive's hotel.

He owed some 384 pounds

He had tried to argue that

it was the government's duty to pay his upkeep but the judge ruled in
favor of the hotel manager.

It is likely that the man exaggerated

Purdy's bill, nevertheless, by admitting that he had not paid any of
his room and board, Purdy became liable for the entire bill. 32

Major

Wilburn Hall, onetime lieutenant in the Confederate navy, left a sixmonth lease unpaid when he went on leave in 1876 never to return to
Egypt again.

Fortunately, the Assistant-Consul of the United States

in Cairo was able to sub-lease the house and cover the bill.

3.libid.' pp. 112-113.
32 Ibid., p. 115.

33 Ibid.

33

. . ,.

78
Colonel

w.

Dunlop tried to use the same argument of responsibility as

Purdy when he was brought to court over the payment for his uniform.

He claimed that since it was a military expense, the Egypti

nent should pay

th~

bill of some 690 francs. He paid his debt only

after the Anerican Consul moved to attach a garnishment on his salary.
A partial excuse for this cavalier financial behavior can be
offered.

Pay days in the Egyptian army were erratic and often delayed

for months at a time.

This became more and more frequent in the later

years of the American mission as Ismail' s treasury sunk further into
bankruptcy.

There were ti.mas when the officers were unable to pay

for their legitimate needs.

However, not all of the debts, as was

shown, can be blamed on "payless paydays."

35

The reputation of the

American officers suffered as a result of these abuses.
A contributing factor to the many problems of the American
mission was the varying linguistic abilities of the man.

A large

)j

proportion of them were fluent in French when they arrived, and this
proved very useful in Cairo and Alexandria.

However, only the upper

echelon officials, princes, and some generals spoke French.
officers left

fo~

When the

the hinterlands, a fair knowledge of Arabic or an

interpreter was required.

Most of the officers who led the various

exploratory expeditions learned the colloquial Arabic quickly, and

34Hesseltine, p. 113.
35Those were Colonel Lockett's words for the situation.

34
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consequently they functioned well.

It was the men who did not have a

sufficient command of either language that caused the problems.

General

Loring, one of the oldest officers in his mid-sixties, never fully

mastered French. Many a conflict arose due to the resulting counnunication gap as will be illustrated later.

General· Stone tried to mini-

mize this language problem by insisting that the men General Sherman
36
recomn:randed to him be fluent in French.
Nevertheless, the American
officers continued to converse in English among themselves, and those
officers whose French was weak did not get the opportunity to improve
their language skills. 37

The communication barriers were difficult and

sometimes impossible to overcome.

In a more general sense, the Am=rican officers and their families
did not really adjust to the Egyptian culture, although there were a
few prominent exceptions.
among themselves.

38

·The Americans tended to socialize only

The Stone household was the recognized center of

social activities and their normal gµests included the officers, the
American Consuls, and the few American missionaries in Egypt.

William

Hesseltine, one of the few historians to write about the Americans in

36
William T. Sherman Papers, August 6-0ctober 26, 1872, Library
of Congress Archives, vol. 33, Stone·to Sherman, August 31, 1873.

37
Henry C. Derrick Letters, 1875-78, in private possession, Derrick
to Derrick, Cairo, #20, June 7, 1876 and #1~, April 20, 1877.
38
Hesseltine, pp. 90-119. Most noticeably the men who led the
many expeditions tended to adjust better to this foreign culture.
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Egypt, points out that in the eight years that the Americans lived
in Egypt, none of the bachelor officers married Egyptian wives nor did
any of the daughters of the officers marry native husbands.
~ricans

39

The

lived apart from the.Egyptian world in their own transplanted

American society.

With such insulation, it is not surprizing that many

of the officers could not deal with the petty irritations aimed at them
by their pasha counterparts in the early years, much less the greater
obstacles in the later years of their mission.

Rather than studying

the traditional Islamic culture and appreciating or at least comprehending it, most of the Americans tried to use their own cultural standards as a basis for their judgments.
humorous, more often

dis~st rous,

The results were sometimes

as will be exemplified by the Abys-

sinian campaign of 1875-76 later in this paper.
General Stone, the Chief of Staff and ranking officer among the
Americans, served as their chief spokesman, concilliator, and protector.
It was not an easy position to fulfill judging by the ever present
passive resistance provided by the pashas and the irresponsible and
sometimes illegal activities of the ;American officers.

In addition

to dealing with conflicts arising between the natives and the Americans,
Stone had to keep peace among his own men.

Considering that most of

men had fought against each other a decade earlier, incidents were

39

Ibid. The two chapters, "Delta Days" and "Problems of a Pasha"
which detail the American maladjustm=nt are excellent.
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exceedingly rare, but not non·-existentOne such incident concerned the American Consul General George
Butler, nephew of the radical, Republican Senator Benjamin Butler,

better known to the South as Beast Butler, and three former confederate
officers, General Loring, Colonel A. Reynolds, and Major Campbell.
Butler and two drunken accomplices, assaulted the three officers in a
restaurant after a brief exchange of greetings.

Butler, nursing a

grievance, insulted Major Campbell and when he turned to respond,
the Consul General rushed at him.

Campbell defended himself with a

cane and Butler shouted to one of his friends to kill him.

The unfor-

tunate Campbell was shot in the leg and Butler and his accomplices
fled the premises.

The Egyptian police were called but Consul General

Butler claimad diplomatic immunity for his trigger-happy friend.

Both

the Consul and the culprit boarded the evening steamer for Brindisi
but not before Butler had cabled Washington saying that there was a
Confederate plot to assassinate him.
own

40

Butler had already damaged his

reputation in Egypt with frequent irresponsible actions, usually

under alcoholic influence, and diplomatic
last.

~

pas; this one was his

General Stone was left to pick up the pieces.

Happily for

American prestige, the next Consul General, R. Beardsley, served with
distinction, helping to erase the embarrassing m:mories of George Butler.

40
william T. Sherman Papers, vol. 32, February 28-August 5, 1872,
Library of Congress Archives, Stone to Sherman, Cairo, July 30, 1872.
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On a different but equally difficult note, some American officers

had a tendency to take Ismail' s guarantee for personal satis·faction too
literally.

They would go to Stone and insist upon an audience. with the

Khedive whenever they were angered at some action.

This undermined

Stone's authority to a certain extent because an officer could disregard
Stone and threaten to take his case directly to the Khedive.

Stone

usually circumvented the action, but sometimes he was forced to modify
his decisions.
count.

Colonel Chaille-Long was particularly difficult on this

When he learned that· an officer who had arrived in Egypt after

Chaille-Long was going to be promoted., he threatened to write to the
Khedive complaining of the injustice this promotion would represent to
all of the American

.

office~s

in Egypt.

41

This kind of insubordination

must have given General Stone more than one headache throughout the
duration of his command in Egypt.

Captain Coppinger, the officer in

question, was given a medal rather than the full promotion as originally
proposed.
The resistance of the pashas to a centralized command, their
hostility to modern education, and their lack of respect for the
American officers presaged disaster for the American mission.

How-

ever, if there was one man who could control the situation with all
of its loose strings, it was General c. P. Stone.

41

He possessed the

charles Chaill.e-Long, Four Continents, p. 56. .
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necessary temperament required of the job, as Captain Morgan attests:
The Chief of Staff was very suave--he was not only a most accomplished man in his profession, but he was a born manipul.ator of
men~ Mott, Loring, Sibley, Kennon and several others had formed.
a cabal against him, but he handled the whole crowd as though
theywat'a so many naughty children and before he got through
they were tame enough to eat out of his hand and be~~ing his
influence when they wanted favors from the Khedive.
Such were Stone's talents, but they would not be enough. to save the
American mission from its final fate.

42 Morgan, p. 300.

._ . . . . _

CHAPTER V

THE ULTIMATE DEFEAT

With each passing year of his reign, Ismail's financial difficulties
grew substantially worse.

When he came to power in 1863 the public debt

of Egypt was L 3,293,000.

But through his spendthrift habits and the

spiraling costs of modernization, Ismail had increased the standing debt
in 1876 to t 68,110,000, not including an additional floating debt of some
L 26,000,000.

sioner

o~

As roughly computed by Lord Cromer, the future High Connnis-

Egypt, that was an average increase in the debt oft 7,000,000

a year while Ismail was Khedive of Egypt. 1

During the cotton boom years

early in his reign, Ismail had little difficulty borrowing from the European banking houses, but after the cotton collapse the interest terms on
the loans jumped to outrageous rates.

One loan had to follow another in

order to pay off the previous one, with the terms growing progressively
worse.

By 1875 the only major resource in Egypt not mortgaged was the

Suez Canal.

In desperation, Ismail sold his shares in the Suez Canal

1Ear.l of Cromer, Modern Egypt, vol. 1 (New York:
Company, 1908), p. 11.

The MacMillan
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Company to Great Britain in November, 1875, in order to meet an upcoming
interest

payment~ 2 To all intents and purposes, that was tha.end of Ismail's

control over his own destiny.

The four million pounds that Ismail received

for his stock were not nearly enough to pay all of his bills, and it could
only postpone the inevitable

bankruptcy of Egypt a few months longer.

Throughout those final months of financial decay, Ismail continued
to make extravagant plans and spend money hoping that each new project
might save him.

In spite of these dreary statistics, the American·led

expeditions into Central Africa continued.

General Charles Gordon (who

.replaced Sir Samuel Baker as Governor-General of the Sudan) continued
actively fighting the slave trade in the Sudan, while Werner Munzinger,
now Consul for both the French and the British in Massawa was meddling in
northern Abyssinia.

Yet throughout this period of fiscal chaos, Ismail

continued to finance them all.

It was not surprizing that the British and

French bondholders were ·concerned with the situation.
tures of Ismail were costing a

~ortune

These imperial ven-

and they were not producing a finan-

cial return, and in the meantin:e Ismail was about ready to default on his
loan payments.

Consequently, by 1875 the European bondholders were on the

verge of taking control of the Egyptian treasury.
The Europeans had not been enthusiastic about Isma.il's military plans
from the beginning.

2

The British and the French had watched the various

The United States Consular Despatches, vol. 11, EGYPT:
to Fish, desp. 384, December 11, 1875.

Beardsley
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arms orders closely, and they voiced their concern at the employnent of
the Americans.

Initially they suspected that Ismail intended· to use the

American officers to help him win independence from the Sultan: .In May.

1870, the French government intimated to Nubar Pasha, Ismail's Minister
of

Fore~gn

Affairs, that in spite of France's long-standing friendship

with Egypt, she could not support:this policy aimed at revolt and she
would "be compelled to side with England and the rest of Europe.

In the

event of trouble America will be far away and it is not Egypt or the canal
that will suffer, but the Khedive." 3 . The British,· for their part.,. merely
warned that the orders for arms placed in Am=rica were unacceptable.

Lord

Lyons, the British Ambassador to France, told Nubar.bluntly·that "if the
matter were not cleared up it might create new troubles and complications
which Europe did not desire."

4

It is very doubtful that Ismail ever in-

tended to openly resist the Ottoman Sultan, but the French and the British
certainly let- him know where he would stand if he did try.
· The Anerican officers were -aware of the general European antipathy
to their presence in the Egyptian anny.

As one officer described it,

"The English are in great influence here and would like to absorb all
the places of the government; the French also, the Italians and the
Germans have their own cliques, and all combined would be glad to

3
· Pierre Crabites, Americans·· in the Egyptian Army (London:

George Rutledge & Sons, Ltd.,
4 Ibid.

19~3),

p. 44.
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see the few American officers here displaced with themselves or their
countrymen substituted therefore."

5

Colonel Chaille-Long claims that

the British demanded dismissal of the Americans after the French catas-

trophe at Sedan in 1871.6 The British sensed that their influence in
Egypt would ·now eclipse the badly defeated French and they assumed
that the Khedive would be more sympathetic to English opinions.
theless, their demands came to no avail at· that time.

Never-

However, the

British were always sensitive to the American presence.

For example,

Colonel Stanton, the British Consul General in Cairo, tried to prevent
Colonel Chaille-Long's appointment as Chief of Staff to General Gordon.
He would have preferred another

~nglishma.n. 7

In general, the Amaricans

held their ground as long as they achieved the results they were paid
to accomplish.
By 1875 the British and French apprehensions peaked.

The bottom

had all but fallen out of the Egyptian treasury, and there was speculation that Ismail was about ready to finance the invasion of Abyssinia,
probably with the encouragement of the American officers.
were rampant and factual information scarce.

The rumors

When asked specifically

5
The Henry C. Derrick Letters, 1875-78, in private possession,
Derrick to Derri~k, #8, February 23, 1877.
6charles Chaille~Long, My Life on Four Continents, vol. 1 (London:
Hutchinson & Company, 1912), p. 41. Chaille-Long states that had it not
been for the persuasion of the Russian Consul General's wife, the American mission would have been dismissed at that early date.
7

Ibid. , p. 70 •

~
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by Lord Vivian, the British acting Consul in Alexandria, whether he
intended total conquest of Abyssinia, Ismail denied any such intention.

He merely wanted to live in peace with the Abyssinians, but it seemed

that this was not possible as long as they continued to raid the peaceful fellahin villages along their mutual border.

8

However, the European

diplomats viewed the growing Egyptian involvement in Abyssinia as part
of the total imperial scheme for expansion in Africa and the latest
development in a long history of Egyptian expansion in the area.
The roots of this current conflict between Egypt and Abyssinia in
mid-1875 date

back to the reign of Muhammad Ali.

However, Ismail did

not take an interest in this area until May, 1865, when the ports of
Suakin and Massawa on the Red Sea were once again ceded to Egypt by a
firma.n from Sultan Abdul Aziz.

9

An 1866 firman granted to Ismail

additional land surrounding the two ports.

10

The British watched Ismail's

expansion carefully and they might not have allowed this Ottoman administrative transfer had it not been for Ismail's solemn promise to
abolish the thriving slave trade of the ports.

The Sultan acquiesced

8
GeorgesDouin, Histoire du Regne du Khedive Ismail, Tome III, 2e
Partie, (Rome: Societe Royale de Geographie d'Egypte, 1936), pp. 417-18.
9
M. Abir, "Ethiopian-Egyptian Border Problems," Journal of
African History 8(1967), pp. 443-461.
10
E. R. Turton, "Kirk and the Egyptian Invasion of East Africa
in 1875: A Reassessment," Journal of African History 11(1970), p. 357.
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to the arrangement for the rather considerable sum of t 25,000 Egyptian (the original rental paid by Muhammad Ali) plus another t 7,500
Egyptian or t 32,500 Egyptian annually.

11

trolled the Egyptian side of the Red Sea.

With this move Ismail conHe also blocked Abyssinian

access to the sea, a situation the Abyssinians were not going to accept
quietly.

Fortunately for Ismail, internal conflicts in Abyssinia

prevented any immediate reaction to the Egyptian occupation of the
port cities.
In January, 1872, the Ras (chief) of Tigre in northern Abyssinia
was crowned King John and the situation changed abruptly.

12

Ismail had

taken advantage of the Abyssinian disunity during the seven years since
the 1865 firman and he had actively pursued Egyptian hegemony along the
Red Sea littoral to the Gulf of Aden.

In 1870 the Egyptian naval squad-

ron was stationed in the area to cruise along the coast from Suakin to
Cape Guardafui.

13

In 1872 with a comparatively unified Abyssinia behind

him, King John intended to win back Abyssinian access to the sea.

14

Using

the territory of Bogos as his base, the king began his campaign by haras-

11

'
"
..
re
Histoire du Regne du Khedive Ismail, Tome III, 1
Societe Royale de Geographie d'Egypte, 1936), pp. 276-77.

Geors.e~ l;)ouin,

Partie (Rome:
12

John Marlowe, Spoiling the Egyptians (New York:
Press, 1975), p. 136.
13

14

St. Martin's

Ibid., p. 137.

Abyssinia, in the second half of the nineteenth century, was
divided into a series of semi-independent kingdoms which clained at
least a marginal allegiance to the "King of Kings." There were three
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sing the Egyptian fellahin living along the Egyptian-Abyssinian frontier.
Raiding parties pillaged the small villages and .farms.

King John's army·

was poorly armed and disciplined but highly motivated and courageous

when there was booty to be taken.

The border situation was not to be

tolerated and in his letter of March 3, 1872, Ismail laid out his plan
for the invasion and conquest of the territory of Bogos to Munzinger
Pasha.15
Munzinger was to send an ultimatum to King John and if he failed
to desist, which Ismail fully expected, Munzinger was to occupy Bogos.

16

Munzinger Pasha agreed and he left Suez on April 4, 1872, with 800 men
and the required supplies to conquer Bogos.

17

By late June, the Egypt-

ian troops with their superior weapons had completely subjugated the
small territory, and Munzinger Pasha was installed as the military

claimants to this title upon King Theodore's death in 1868. John IV,
the Negus of Tigr~, was not able to assuioo the title until 1872 after
displacing his first competitor, Tikle Georgis. Menelik II, the Negus
of Shoa, John's second rival, prudently chose to accept John's claim.
Menelik concentrated his interest to the south and east while King
John antagonized the Egyptians in the north. Abyssinia was united
on the surface, but the rivalry between these two men was intense.
Upon King John's death in 1889, Menelik becama the "King of Kings."
He truly united Abyssinia and maintained its independence in the
face of the nineteenth century European colonialism in Africa.
15 nouin, 2e Partie, p. 338.
16
17

Ibid.
Ibid., p. 340.

91

governor in Keren, the capital of Bogos.

18

Ismail explained his actions

in Bogos to the European and American diplomats by pointing ·to King
John's predatory intrusions and by guaranteeing a more peaceful existeµce

for the native inhabitants. Furthermore, he theorized that it was Egypt's
mission in the modern world to civilize Africa.

He would build a rail-

road from upper Egypt to Massawa and it would have to go through Bogos;
however, Ismail disavowed any further interest in the Abyssinian territory.

19

King John was left to b,ide his time and to plan his retaliation.
Ismail's next move was the occupation of Berbera, a port in the
Gulf of Aden, in 1873.

20

This venture brought him into direct conflict

with the British interests in the area.

In the past, the British Resident

of Aden had kept a close watch on the events and affairs in Berbera, but
the Egyptian expansion imperiled British prerogatives.

In August, 1875,

.an agreement between the Khedive and Consul General Stanton cleared up
the situation.

The Sultan, accordingly, issued a firman on July 5, 1875,

ceding the ports of Zeila and Berbera to Ismail for the tribute of
a year.

21

~

15,000

The convention drawn up the following month between Egypt

18United States Consular Despatches, vol. 6, EGYPT:
Fish, desp. 19, October 16, 1872.

Beardsley to

19united States Consular Despatch~s, vol. 7, EGYPT:
Fish, desp. 46, December 12, 1872.

Beardsley to

20

Marlowe, p. 138.

21

United States Consular Despatches, vol. 10, EGYPT:
Fish; desp. 337,·July 17, 18J5.

Beardsley to
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and Great Britain allowed Ismail virtual control of the African coast
as far as Cape Guardafui.

22

The British once again bowed to Ismail's

plans on the guarantee that an active campaign would be waged against

the slave trade.
Moving farther to consolidate his position in Africa, Ismail
ordered Raouf Pasha to Zeila on July 16, 1875, to become the M.aamour
(commander of the troops) of the city, and he further instructed him
to establish a secure route for the lucrative trade caravans coming
from Harrar.

In secret, Raouf Pasha was ordered to take Harrar but

to cover his movements by stating he was looking for the sources of the
Sobat River, in case the British were curious.

23

Raouf Pasha with 1,200

troops captured the walled city of Harrar with little opposition on
October 11, and word was sent to the European and American consuls that
the King of Harrar had obstructed the free passage of the caravans,
hence the necessity for Egyptian control of the city of Harrar.

24

Naturally King John was upset; first Massawa, then Bogos and
Berbera.

Now Zeila and Harrar were occupied by Isma.il's forces.

A

glance at a map of the area amply illustrates the extent to which

22rurton, p. 358.

23
\
.•
Georges Douin, Histoire du Regne du Khedive Ismail, Tom= III,
3e Partie, facs, A (Rome: Societe Royale de Geographie d'Egypte, 1936),
p. 602.

24

charles P. Stone, "The Political Geography of EgyPt," Journal
of the American Geographical Society of New York 15(1884), p. 369.
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Abyssinia had been encircled.
began his· counter-move.
Cairo.

During the summer of 1875, King John

Rtnnors of his gathering forces soon· reached

It appeared that his army was being assembled on the northern

frontier of Abyssinia and readied for the invasion of Hamesin, a buffer
25
state between the two powers.
In early August he attacked 30,000
strong and by late September the army was a sixteen hour march from
Ma.ssawa.

26

Ismail was determined that this threat should be met.

An air of secrecy surrounded the entire Abyssinian c·ampaign.
Colonel Chaille-Long, the initial choice for commander of the expedition
was recalled from furlough in France to take connnand, only to be replaced·
at the last minute by a Danish officer, Colonel Arendrup.

27

.
MaJor

Durholtz, a Swiss officer, did not receive the details of his assignment until he left Cairo, while Major James Dennison, a former second
lieutenant in the Union Army, was awakened in the middle of the night
and told to report that very morning prepared to leave for Massawa.

25
United States Consular Despatches,
Fish, desp. 364, November 26, 1875.

·vo~.

11, EGYPT:

28

Beardsley to

26Ibid.
27
William McE.- Dye, Moslem Egypt and Christian Abyssinia (New
York: Atkins and Prout, 1880; reprint ed., New York: Negro Universities Press, 1969), pp. 130-31.
28

charles Chaille-Long, Four Continents, p. 174. Arendrup's
wife, according to Chail~e-Long, appealed to.Nubar Pasha, President
of the Council of Ministers, to allow her husband to .be commander of
the expedition.
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. The expedition consisted of 2,500 men armed with Remington rifles, two
"

. 29

six-gun batteries of mountain howitzers, and six.rocket stands.

This

small but well-armed force was considered more than adequate to meet
and humiliate King John's motly force.
Simultaneous with the departure of Arendrup's expedition to
Abyss"'inia, Munzinger Pasha was ordered· to lead a force of some 600 men
into the Shoa country and join with King Menelik's forces.

30

It was

believed that Menelik, who was fueding with King John, would be willing
to attack the Abyssinian king on his southern frontier, thus forcing
him to divide his forces and guaranteeing·the Egyptians an easy victory.

On his arrival in Massawa; Arendrup dispatched a letter to King
John stating· that his orders were to secure the Egyptian border and to

collect an indemnity for the damage perpetrated by the Abyssinian raid-

. 31
.
ing parties.
When no answer arrived, Arendrup boldly advanced into
the Hamasin te·rritory, too boldly. for his own welfare.

Colonel Lockett

'·

swmnarized the disaster. that occqrred in the following concise manner:.
He (Arendrup) advanced with foolhardy copfidence into the
heart of the enemy's ·country, was deceived and betrayed by the
Governor of Hamasin, was enveighed by superior strategy into

·n • • . •

~illiam Loring,

29

A Confederate Soldier in Egypt (New York:
Dodd; Mead & Company, 1884),, p. 301.
samuel Lockett Pa~ers, "Notes on the Abyssinian Ca~aign,"·
Southern Historical Collection, University of North Carolina.
30
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the valley of the march, and was completely surrounded by an
overwhelming force of the Abyssinians. And when his little
army was attacked on all sides, his men instead of fighting
like soldiers, huddled together like sheep and fired a short
time in the air, and then stood and allowed themselves to be
mowed down like grain before the reaper's blade. The whole
party with the exceptions of a few, outposts, rear guards and
reconnoitering parties was demolished in about one hour as
reported by an Englishman in King John's army.3 2
Arendrup had ignored every standard military precaution possible
on his

~disastrous

march inland.

When General Stone realized that

Arendrup had advanced over one hundred miles from his base of supplies,
he sent orders for the Dane to halt and fortify his position and to
. re i n f orcements. 33
await

Whether the order reached the commander or

simply arrived too-late is not known, but even without word from Cairo,
Arendrup had been warned of his danger.

Major Dennison, an experienced

officer, recognized the precariousness of their position.

According to

General Loring, Dennison"begged" Colonel Arendrup not to endanger the
mission by entering an unknown valley deep into the enemy's country
without even locating the enemy's position. 34

Arendrup persisted in

his course; however, he did accept Dennison's alternative suggestion

32

Lockett, "Notes." General Kirkham, a renegade English soldier
who_served without distinction under Gordon in China, was the selfappointed advisor to King John's army. He was detained in Massawa in
December, 1875, by General Ratib Pasha while on a consular mis.sion for

King John. He provided accurate and detailed information on the Abyssinian army; however, the Egyptian commander did not trust the source
and Kirkham's warnings went unheeded. He died shortly thereafter, a
prisoner of the Egyptians.
33

1oring, p. 301.

3.4Lockett, "Notes."
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to fortify their rear.

On November 18, 1875, the day of the dis·astrous.

battle of Gundet, Dennison and his small company were stationed on a
plateau five or six miles back, to protect the rear and man two pieces
of mountain artillery.

The~

did not learn of the battle until re-

treating stragglers, who were badly wounded and mutilated, reached the
small camp a day later.

35

At first, Dennison was determined to stand and fight.

However,

upon learning the scope of the catastrophe and finding that his men
refused to continue holding their position, he had no choice but to
recon~ider

his decision.

The retreat plans were organized quickly after

the arrival of a letter from King John demanding their surrender.

Denni-

son sent a reply-designed to stall for time, and the men spiked the
cannons and slipped out of camp.

At Khaya Khor they met up with Major

Raif and his company, who like themselves had been assigned elsewhere ·
during the battle.

The reunited forces then retreated to Massawa to

bring the terrible news of defeat. 36
The Munzinger expedition met a similar fate.

He and his men were

betrayed and murdered by their guides near Lake Aussa in Galla country,
on November 15, only three days before Arendrup net his death.

35

Loring, p. 304.

361ockett, "Notes."
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company led by an alert native officer retreated, fighting most of the
way to ultimately relate their harrowing tale.

37

News of this disaster

reached Cairo in mid-December, but by that time major retaliatory action
was already underway.
The Egyptian government tried unsuccessfully to prevent news of
the Arendrup disaster from becoming public for fear of its effect upon
the Egyptian finances and prestige.

But less than two weeks after the

annihilation, the Amarican Consul General Beardsley, sent a dispatch with
the news and the prediction that this defeat would have unfortunate
political and financial effects.

38

The financial situation was about

to break wide open even without a·military disaster like this to emphasize the Egyptian problems.

Ismail had just finished selling Egypt's

last major resource, the Suez Canal shares.

If he did not retaliate

immediately as cotmnonly expected, the true condition of his government's
coffers might be suspected.

He had to react quickly to forestall the

discovery of his impending bankruptcy.

General Stone also wanted to

retaliate quickly, although for a somewhat different reason.

His

revitalized army had just taken a tremendous beating and the Atrerican
prestige was at stake.

Perhaps he saw this as an

op~n

opportunity to

display the superiority of modern organization and technology versus

37Ibid.
38
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the traditional pasha system.

39

With Ismail and Stone agreeing upon

the necessity of immediate action, planning for a second expedition
began.

General Stone itnIIediately set the Third Section in action making_
maps for the expedition.

He had received a comnunique with specific,

first-hand descriptions of the territory that had to be analyzed and
compiled from Father Duflot, a Jesuit priest who worked in the area.

40

The strategy and logistics of the campaign were worke·d out in advance
by General Stone, Prince Hussein, the Minister of War and their staffs
with consultation with Ismail and his cabinet.

The first confrontation

between the Americans and the pashas arose over the selection of the
cottmlander for the expedition.

General Stone suggested General Loring

as the most experienced man available.

He received the tacit support

of Ismail and the active support of the Minister of Foreign Affairs,
Nubar Pasha.

Consequently, General Loring was ordered to report to

Cairo inmediately to take connnand of the expedition.

On his arrival,

however, Loring was informed that he would be the Chief of Staff and
second in command to General Ratib Pasha.
The cabinet ministers felt that the chief in command ought to be
a Muslim and Nubar Pasha (a Christian

A~nian)

was prevailed upon to

39This is the theory of both Pierre Crabites and· William Hesseltine the only two scholars to publish a book on the American mission
to Egypt.
40Lockett, "Notes."
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Ratib Pasha, a close friend of Sherif Pasha the current Prime

agre~.

Minister, was selected as the commander.

41

Almost as if to eounter

this first defeat, General Stone assigned virtually every European

and American Staff officer he had to the expedition:
Dye, Colonel Charles

W~

Colonel William

Field, Lieutenant Colonel Henry Derrick, Lieu-

tenant Colonel Macklin, a Swiss officer, Major Charles F. Loshe, Major
Robert Lamson, Major Dulier, a Belgian officer, Surgeon Major W. W.
Wilson, Surgeon Major Thomas D. Johnson, Captain Sormani, an. Italian,
Captain David Porter, and Captain Henry Irgens.

Later Lieutenant

Colonel Charles Graves and Colonel Samuel Lockett were added to the
roster.

42

In the final planning days, the connnanding officer, Generals
Ratib and Loring, and Colonels Dye and Field were sunnnoned to three
separate meetings with the Khedive, General Stone, and Nubar Pasha to
be briefed and to make their own suggestions.

The military features

of the country were discussed and all other elements that pertained to
the campaign were finalized.

43

There seems to have been a feeling

among the American officers that.they ought to have been more closely
consulted.

However, they accepted the plans with only a few suggestions.44

41Loring, p. 333.
42

43

Lockett, "Notes."
Dye, p. 155.

44 Loring, p. 335.
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Colonel Dye was particularly concerned about the insufficient plans
made for their transportation into the Abyssinian interior.
At the meetings the men were also briefed as to the political
and military objectives of the expedition.

Ismail made it very clear

that the purpose of this campaign was to punish King John.

45

They

were to advance until either they engaged the Abyssinians in battle
or captured King John's capital, Adua.

Nubar Pasha, on the other hand,

was adamatlt that the expedition be carried out quickly (before the
beginning of the rainy season), and upon their successful conclusion
they must evacuate the area and return to Cairo immediately.

46

It was

to be fully evident that Muslim Egypt had no plans for annexing.Christian Abyssinia in part or in its entirety.

Nubar Pasha was quite

certain that Europe would not allow more than a brief foray into
Abyssinian territory, and he wished to avoid any additional complications.
With the organization complete, Ismail placed Ratib Pasha's hand
into General Loring's hand as a symbol of fraternity and asked that
both men work together in harmony, specifically noting that Ratib
should pay heed to all of Loring's suggestions.

47

The bulk of the

staff officers and the troops (variously estimated at between 16,000
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and 20,000 man) left by steamers from Suez for Massawa on December 6,
1875. 48

Upon arrival in Massawa some two weeks later, the base camp

for the expedition was set up.

That was to be just about the last

thing General Loring and Ratib Pasha were to agree upon.

The most

important portion of the account of the Abyssinian campaign was not
"the actual battle between the two warring countries but rather the
less physical but equally fierce conflict between the traditional pashas
and the American officers.

In fact one can blama the less than satis-

factory results of the Abyssinian campaign on the general lack of coordinated action between the comnanding officers, General Ratib Pasha
and General Loring.
The problems of General Loring fell into four interrelating categories; authority, language, transportation, and communications with
Cairo.

The first problem, authority concerned the existence of two

staffs:

Lorings's official staff and Ratib's secret.staff.

Immediately

upon his arrival in Massawa, Loring set about establishing his staff on
a modified plan of the general staff in Cairo.

The various foreign

staff officers, once assigned their duties, went to work only to find
someone else had been ordered to do their job, or more often, they
found a native officer doing exactly the opposite of their own orders.
For example, Lieutenant Colonel Mocklin was to be the assistant Inspector

48

Derrick, Letter 18,

~cember

6, 1875.
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General, and he was charged with the duty of inspecting the supply

·

trains to verify that the goods sent into the interior matched the
orders.

He soon found that his orders from Loring were nearly opposite

his native co-officer's orders from Ratib Pasha.

49

Ali Bey, (an Italian

officer who had converted to Islam) was assigned as Chief of Ordnance,
but he found he could only watch over the ordnance stores.

He had no.

power to prevent each commander from appropriating his private stocks.
After a few weeks of this chaos, Ali Bey could stand the frustration no
longer and an Arab officer was assigned as his replacexoont.
Such incidents appeared regularly.

50

Major Losche, assigned to

the Quartermaster section, went out into the countryside in search of
supplies only to find Ratib's officers had already done so.

Lieutenant

Colonel Derrick found the sane kinds of obstructions on the engineering
side of the camp.

51

Ratib Pasha's personal staff worked independently

of General Loring and his staff; hence, the confusion and delays were
considerable and chronic.

To make matters worse, General Loring's

orders were generally ignored or at least disputed unless Ratib Pasha's
seal was prominantly displayed on the papers.

Colonel Dye, head of

the administrative section, complained that even after jointly issuing

49
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an order with General Loring,. Ratib Pasha would nearly always send a
conflicting order on the same topic to his personal staff.

52

Loring

would confront Ratib Pasha with the evidence, and the pasha would be

penitent and promise to consult his Chief of Staff in the future, only
to send a new set of private orders the next day.
Loring believed that this obstructive behavior represented the
pashas' opposition to the entire campaign.

He claimed that Ratib Pasha,

Osman Pasha, and the other high ranking native officers were doing their
best to prevent this campaign from ever succeeding.

Loring. blamed this

attitude upon a combination of cowardice, apathy, and unwillingness to
openly disobey the Khedive.

53

Loring's opinion aside, there was

another reason for the apparent obstruction or misinterpretation of
the orders.

General Loring's colorful English lost much of its meaning

in his frantic attempts to translate his orders into French and/or
Arabic.

General Ratib, for his part, spoke only a modicum, of French

and between the two men the communication gap was insurmountable.
Interpreters on both staffs did exist.

54

However, both Loring and

Dye, the two men who wrote of their Abyssinian experiences, disclaim
any competence on the part of these linguists.

Dye credits only one

man, Major Fritz Thurnheyssen, an Austrian who was fluent in six

52 Ibid., p. 218.
53

Loring, p. 343-344.
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languages, as capable.

Unfortunately he goes on to state that ·Thurn-

heyssen was a snob and one of Ratib's cohorts which did not ~nspire any
confidence among the officers of the general stBiff.
~

55

The lack of

ade~

quate interpreters meant that all orders to the line had to be written
and translated into Arabic, French, Turkish, and English.

Colonel

Dye's section was supposed to handle this duty, but he claims that he
was so understaffed that any staff officer who happened to walk past
the tent was conscripted for ten minutes to an hour to help copy the
documents. 56

This situation could only add to the already considerable

communications problem.
The third problem area concerned the transportation of this
massive army over the Abyssinian mountains into the relatively unmapped
and unknown enemy country.

Dye had complained of the transportation

plans while still in Cairo, and he had been assured that the necessary
drivers, animals, and carts would be supplied.
his fears came ·true.

However, the worst of

After one month in Massawa scrounging for any

animal with four feet, the expedition counted forty-four elephants,
600 carts., and 2.,000 camels or approximately twenty percent of the
promised transportation needs for an army of 16,000 to 20,000 ~n.57
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Dye, p. 167.
Ibid., p. 176.

57 Dye, p. 205.

106

In order to reach the interior and complete their mission before the
rainy season, they had to start regardless ·of the transportation shortage.

Obviously the shortage hindered their progress considerably, and

it maant that all unessential baggage had to be left behind.
The final problem concerned the written communication difficultie.s
the Americans experienced in sending their

~ssages

and mail ·to Cairo.

Apparently soon after their arrival in Massawa, one of the Americans
criticized General Ratib in a letter home and word of his remarks leaked
to the public.

In turn, Ratib Pasha received word

the Khedive's court of this criticism.

fro~

his friends in

The next thing General Loring

knew an order·from the Khedive arrived requiring all correspondence from
the forces to be censored.
official messages.

58

This order included both unofficial and

The Americans were furious, especially when the

order was later modified to allow the native officers the privacy of
sealing their letters.

This action left the Americans fuming at the

blatant favoritism towards the pashas.

Eventually General Loring

obtained permission to communicate with General Stone privately, but
the American officers were not allowed to write
out the campaign.

ho~

in privacy through-

The magnitude of this problem becaioo painfully appar-

ent at the unsuccessful conclusion of the expedition when the American
officers found themselves isolated and without the means of communication
to tell their side of the story.

58Loring, pp. 340-341.
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General Ratib Pasha, for his part, had some legitimate complaints
to lodge against General Loring and his staff.

With the language problem

being what it was, he felt that his native staff was necessary in order

to accomplish all the needed work for the campaign.

Ragab Sadik,-a

native officer kept an interesting and informative journal of the campaign.

His January 18, 1876 entry alludes to the linguistic difficulties

of the Arab commanders.

Since the staff officers did not know Arabic,
'

the orders from Ratib were often referred to the lower ranking native
officers of the general staff.

Those men were supposed to connnunicate

the orders upward to the foreign staff officers.

59

It is clear that

this was not always happening and the resulting discord contributed
substantially to the ensuing disaster.
General Ratib Pasha also had a better sense of the capabilities
of the rank and file fellah.

General Loring was a blustery American

Indian fighter whose concepts of warfare were aggressive and left
little room for hesitation.

The Egyptian troops

on the whole were

not used to fighting, and they were extremely jittery.

King John had

liberated scores of mutilated prisoners for the green Egyptian troops to
·witness.
army.

Understandably, they were not excited about meeting the King's

These men needed to gain some confidence, but General Loring's

5
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enthusiasm for battle did not allow for this· aspect of the Egyptian
temperam=nt.

Ratib Pasha would have preferred to meet the enemy on

his own terms, from a fortified position in a fort.

When immediate

victory did not come to the Abyssinians, the army would begin to disintegrate and the Egyptian troops, with a new sense of confidence,
would have been ready to fight.

60

Unfortunately, either Loring was not

listening to Ratib's reasoning or he did not understand it.
The third problem for Ratib Pasha was identical to Loring's; that
of authority.

Just as Loring's orders were disputed and ignored by

the natives, General Ratib felt that his orders were often disputed
and ignored. by the European and American staff officers.

To make

matters even worse, Prince Hassan, the third son of Ismail, showed up
ostensibly to gain some experience and to serve as the nominal Commanderin Chief above Ratib Pasha.

Prince Hassan had studied in England and

was fluent in English, French, and German, as well as his native languages
of Arabic and Turkish.

He had been recalled from serving as an honorary

subaltern officer in the Prussian Cavalry service to accompany the
Abyssinian expedition.

Ratib welcomed the Prince, but he soon found

that Ismail's son, with his European education often sided with the
general staff decisions over his heaa.

60
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Hence, the command was further
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split and the

inconsis~ncies

abounded.

Under these circumstances,

the Abyssinians were, at times, the least of the expedition's enemies.
Ironically, one of Ismail's purposes for sending Prince Hassan was

to keep peace between the two generals. Word of their dissension had
come back to Cairo, and he sensed that peace between the two men was
vital to the success of the mission.

If the campaign turned into a

failure it would not only destroy the American reputation in E$ypt but
it would probably complete the disintegration of his power.

Ismail

believed that this dissension was the work of someone, and he secretly
ordered Hassan, in a letter dated January 23, 1876, to find and report
the culprit to him.6 2

Hassan wrote back to his father on February 17

assuring him that harmony existed between the general staff and Ratib.

63

It seems that all three of the major connna.nders were on entirely different wave lengths.
In the end no one strategy prevailed, and the campaign was a disaster.

The Egyptian forces met the Abyssinian army in a half-way position

on March 7, 1876 on the plain of Gura.

Loring had wanted the troops from

Fort Gura to join those at Khaya Khor; thus a united army would meet
King John's forces head on with the additional advantage of a dominating
position from above the valley.

62

63

General Ratib wanted the forces to stay

Douin, facs. B, pp. 872-873.

Abdin Archives, Periode Ismail, doss. 9/1, February 17, 1876,
Hassan to Ismail.
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in their respective forts and to fight a defensive battle at first.
Instead o.f either strategy, the troops were ordered to leave.. the security of Fort Gura, but they never joined up with the forces'

the

Khaya Kb.or sum.nit. 64 The split command and split forces met a united
Abyssinian army.

The battle did not last long due to a sudden and

spontaneous retreat initiated by the Egyptian soldiers.

Neither the

American nor the native officers could halt this march to the fort.
The major casualties occurred as a result of the disorganized retreat
and from the Abyssinian slaughter of Egyptian prisoners.

The following

day the Abyssinians laid siege to the fort; but due to lack of experience with siege warfare, the Abyssinian army grew discouraged, and
communications were soon underway for a truce.

65

The recriminations that followed were almost as bloody as the
itself~

battle

The

~rican

officers felt that the native officers,

most particularly General Ratib Pasha, had not followed the Khedive's
instructions to heed General Loring's advice and that his failure to
cooperate was the primary cause of the poor performance of the Egyptian
troops.

The American officers were not pleased with the results of the

campaign to be sure, but on the other hand, most of them had witnessed
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far worse military disasters. 'The Egyptian forces had not even come
close to soundly defeating King John's army, but they were still in
possession of the territory as far as they had advance9.

66

figures likewise were inconclusive in the American eyes.

.

The casualty

General Stone

reported a loss of 1,800 man while Colonel Dye put the figure closer to
3,300 men.

67

In general, the Americans did not see the Abyssinian cam-

paign as an unmitigated di.saster, and the officers felt that as soon as
the American story of the campaign (ie. the incompetence and

cowardice

of the native officers) was made known to Ismail, the Khedive would allow
them to return to fight ·the battle their way.

Unfortunately, the American

officers were never given the opportunity to relate their version of the
story much less were they allowed to resume the campaign.
This

less-than~decisive

campaign could not have com; at a worse

tixoo for Ismail, because on April 8, 1876, the financial crisis cama to
a head.

68

On that day the Khedive was forced to suspend the payment of

his treasury bills.

From that point forward, Ismail was primarily con-

cerned with maintaining his position as Kh.edive and undisputed ·ruler of
Egypt.
to

In this critical hour, Ismail was not interested in listening

la~

excuses from his American officers.

66

He needed all the support

nerrick, Letter 26, Cairo, July 28, 1876.
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he could muster from his

pas~as

to prevent the complete inundation of

his government by the outraged bondholders of Europe.
In the Abyssinian campaign the much acclaimed American technical.

prowess had proven useless as long a.s the traditional. pashas were still
in ultimate control of the situation.

Half-way measures had not worked,

but Ismail was no longer sufficiently secure in his position to give the
Americans full command.

Moreover, he did not want to accept the conse-

quences of.his own vacillation between the pashas and the Americans.
The American officers and their highly trained army were sent to humiliate
King John and they failed.

Ismail was not used to failure in his imperial

ventures, and as Eli E. Farman, the newly appointed

~rican

consul

suggests, one would be relying too much on the good nature of an oriental
potentate to suppose his good humor under the current circumstances.

69

The American officers found themselves isolated and unable to reach the
Khedive for redress as they had in the past.

Obviously the last vestiges

of Ismail's support were gone.
The staff officers were ordered back to Massawa soon after the
battle, but they were not allowed to contact anyone in Cairo, not even

69
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their families.

The Governor of Massawa, the young nephew of Sadik Pasha,

Ismail's notorious Finance Minister, controlled the telegraph.facilities
and he naturally assumed that the Khedive would want all news 'of the

catastrophe contained.

Hence, he effectively silenced any American

stories by placing the telegraph office off limits to the American
officers. 70

Several of the engineering officers received orders to map

portions of the surrounding districts, but the majority of the officers
were left idle in the stifling heat of Massawa.

While the main portion

of the native troops were sent back to Cairo in April, the Americans
were not allowed to return to the capital until late June.
When they arrived in Cairo, they found their political and social
position in the Egyptian government service drastically altered.

The

American officers were now shunned, and they did not receive their normal courtesy reception in court by Ismail.

During the months of their

absence a complete shift in power had occurred.

Nubar Pasha, the western

oriented Foreign Affairs Minister, had been dismissed at the beginning
of the year and the traditional pashas were now in full control of the
government.
With the more traditional forces in power, the Americans were not
surprized to learn that the size and scope of the disaster had been greatly
exaggerated, and of course, the staff officers were entirely at fault for

70 Dye, p. 447.

-
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-t

the Abyssinian fiasco.
either.

The foreign press corps did not help matters

With their aid, the rumors that proliferated in Cairo were soon

rampant in Paris and London.

71

One report even claimed that Prince

Hassan had been captured by King John.

Since the Egyptian policy was to

refrain from any official comment_ on- these speculations, the Europ·ean
newspapers published these rumors circulating in Cairo as fact.
In contrast to the American experience, the Turkish, Circassian
and Arab officers who returned to Cairo directly from the campaign were
well received

i~

court.

Virtually every native officer received a.pro-

motion or high decoration for his performance in Abyssinia.

Many of the

men deserved the promotions but the American officers were infuriated
that the blatantly obstructionist officers, among them General Ratib
Pasha, also received promotions.

72

Emperor Wilhelm of Prussia honored

Prince Hassan with a complimentary promotion to Major in the Prussian
cavalry, however the prince never returned to accept the award because
his father, Ismail had an even greater promotion for Hassan-as Cormnanderin-Chief of the entire Egyptian army. 73

The American officers and those

native officers associated with the general staff did not fair as well.
After more than a year of negotiating, General Stone procured minor

71

72

sherma.n Papers,vol. 40, Stone to Sherman, Cairo, July 13, 1876.
Dye, p.

~83.

73 Ibid. ' p. 484.

115

decorations for all the Americans who participated in the

campaig~,

but

they did not consider that concession as equal treatment.
In addition to the shift in power within the government and the
poor press coverage that the Americans were subject to, a third factor
played a role in their unpopular reception.

Their chief spokesman and

concilliator, General Stone was no longer privy to Ismail's inner staff.
Throughout his twelve years as Chief of Staff, he had been permitted
·daily access to the Khedive. 74
was difficult to arrange.

Now he found that any access at all ·

The Master of Ceremonies would give General

Stone the wrong hour for his scheduled appointment with the Khedive.
Stone would either arrive late, much to the displeasure of Ismail or he
would miss the conference altogether.

75

Without these conferences,

Stone's effective council in military matters and in respect to the
Airerican officers was greatly diminished.

76

As if dealing with the traditional pasha system was not enough of
a problem, Stone found his authority under attack from the Europeans in
Ismail's court as well.

General Charles Gordon, the British Governor-

General of the Sudan, apparently encouraged by the ever calculating
British authorities in Cairo wrote a letter to General Sherman describing

74 Dye, p. 489.
75Ibid., pp. 488-489.
76 rn fact it

~s questionable whether Stone had any influence at all

by that time over the fate of the American mission.

His personal friendship with the Khedive may have.been the only factor at work in regards to
the eventual decoration of the officers.
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the conditions that the American officers were enduring as unbearable.

He even suggested that General Sherman himself come to Egypt .for a visit
to observe and help rectify the situation.

After mailing the letter,

Gordon showed a copy of it to General Stone. Rather astonished at
Gordon's interference, Stone answered all the charges in

th~

letter and

Gordon apologized and requested that Stone inform General Sherman of his
mistake. ·stone felt that any further outside interference would only
hurt ·the position of the officers more.

Besides, they could always

resign if they felt that the situation was intolerable.

Stone believed

that this aggravating episode had been instigated by the British with
the intention of forcing the Anericans out of Egypt.

77

One ·of the difficulties described by General Gordon was the fact
that none of the American officers (including Stone) had been paid since
prior to the Abyssinian campaign.
financial situation was desperate.

Needless to say, by September their
Even those officers who had saved

a portion of their salaries regularly began to feel the pinch.

78

After

ten months without pay, an order was finally given to dole out one'·
month's pay for the men.

79

From October, 1876, to their ultimate dis-

missal in June, 1878, paydays resumed on an irregular basis.

77
78

The final

Sherman Papers, vol. 45, Stone to Sherman, Cairo, February 19, 1877.
Derrick Letters, Letter 32, August 18, 1876.

79Ibid., Letter 48, October 26, 1876.
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settlement, however, did not occur until after the American officers
were officially discharged from the Egyptian service.
An even more direct retaliation against the American officers

came when Colonel Dye was ordered to stand court martial.

A native

officer of low rank accused Colonel Dye of striking him during the
Abyssinian campaign for no apparent reason.

It appeared that Dye, so

frustrated with the man's incompetence and carelessness, had slapped
the officer when he discovered an important box missing.

Due to the

highly emotional atmosphere in Cairo at the time, Dye refused to submit to the court martial even though General Stone had managed to place
two American officers on the four man tribunal.
protection of the Anerican Consul General.

Instead, Dye chose the

Apparently, Colonel Dye was

the sole Atoorican officer to demand the exclusion of the clause exempting
the officer from his contract.

After several interviews with Ismail,

Consul General E. E. Farman was able to have the matter dropped.

80

The months that followed the Abyssinian affair were littered with
such incidents, some minor in character, others more serious as in the
Dye court martial.

Amidst these insults, hardships and attacks, the

American hopes to return to Abyssinia to complete the campaign slowly
died.

Ismail 's desparate financial condit.ion prevented the undertaking

of any new military projects.

8

°Farinan, p. 196.

Some of the engineers were allowed to

118

continue their mapping expeditions; however, most of the men found
themselves with little to occupy their time.

A general dissatisfaction

and a growing resentment directed against General Stone spread amongst

the officers.

Many of the men felt that Stone was no longer promoting

the American interests and that he was appropriating for himself the
recognition for their own individual achievenEnts.
Colonel Chaille-Long claimed that Stone had delayed the publication
of one of his central African reports in order to claim the credit for
himself at some later date.

Even worse, Stone supposedly had promised

him a promotion to brigadier general which never materialized. 81

Chaille-

Long resigned in his anger and blamed Stone for the deterioration of
American morale in Egypt, insisting that Stone had become a "thorough
Turk!"82

Colonel Mason suspected that Stone was favoring Colonel Purdy's

claims to African discoveries.over his own, while Colonel Lockett described the change in Stone's character from "a kind, polished gentleman,
in his outward demeanor to everybody," to a man who had " • • • so much
dealings with slipperiness in Egypt (that) he has become slippery himse lf • "83
It is difficult to gauge exactly what kind of role General Stone

81
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was now playing.

It was only natural that the American officers, beset

with financial problems and professional grievances came to him.

In

the past he had been the American liaiscnwith the Khedive and Stone had
always seemed to obtain satisfactory results.
with little success.

Now Stone's mediation met

How much effort did Stone really expend on the

part of the Axoorican officers?

The number of his meetings with the

Khedive may have decreased but he still saw Ismail with some degree of
regularity.

Was Stone actively pursuing the interests of his compatriots?

Judging from the private letters and published articles of the
various officers under Stone and from his own published articles and
private letters to General Sherman, Stone's personal loyalties lay with
the Khedive.

He would do what he could for his fellow Americans, but

he was more concerned with the well being of Ismail and his Khedival
authority.

In a letter home to his wife shortly before the final dis-

charges, Lieutenent Colonel Henry Derrick tells of the various rumors
circulating "in the streets" about the financial consolidation of the
government and the impending dismissal of the Americans.

He adds,

however, " • • • it may be that all American officers except Stone, will
be discharged.

I do not think Stone will ever leave Egypt during the

lifetime of the present Khedive, after his death and there comes a new
king, who knows not Stone, things may be different.

84nerrick Letters, May 17, 1877.
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Stone truly believed in the same dreams as Ismail.
Khedive 's plans to modernize and develop

Egyp~ ~·the

All of the

dams, the·· canals,

the railroads, the industries, and the military were articles" of faith·.
to Stone and indicative of his cultural heritage as an American.

Stone

could identify with Ismail on this plane in a way no European advisor
with divided loyalties could.

The absence of American interests in

Egypt allowed Stone's complete support for Isma.il's plans.

Furthermore,

the Khedive's optimism and his seemingly endless capacity for digesting
or inventing new ideas appealed to Stone's very American character.

85

Stone was not the only American who believed in the good intentions
of the Khedive, but he was the only one who maintained close enough contact with Ismail to have his sense of accomplishment continually reinforced.

The pessimistic atmosphere of Cairo had less of an effect upon

Stone than it did on the more isolated Am=rican officers under him.
Stone may even have felt the American officers, with all their grumbling
arid dissension, were deserting the Khedive and his plans in his hour
of need.

85

Thus, as it became more and more clear that the Americans

Public Record Office F. O. Archives, 78/2855, July 6, 1878.
Vivian to Marquis of Salisbury, no. 234. (As taken from the personal
notes of Dr. Frederick J. Cox.) "The Khedive informed me in confidence
some time ago that he had desired Prince Hassan to ascertain during his
stay in England whether in place of these officers (the Americans) any
English officers on half pay would consent to take service in his army
on reasonable terms, and whether he could obtain permission to do so."
The Khedive simply never gave up the conviction that he could weather
the financial crisis he had created with all of his plans!
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would have to be dismissed in the new financial shakeup, Stone chose to
stay and support what was left of Ismail's progressive regime.

Stone

would do what he could to help settle with the remaining American officers,
but he felt that the plans and programs established by the Khedive must
come first.

86

While Stone's personal contact with the Khedive helped sustain his
support, it did not spread to his less-privileged American officers.

Sub-

jected to every form of humiliation short of physical detention the rest
of the American officers were discouraged and restless.

The antagonistic

atmosphere created by the combined efforts of the native pashas and the
predatory Europeans had its desired effect.

By the end of 1877, seven of

the remaining twenty-one officers had resigned:

Colonel Chaille-Long,

Colonel Lockett, Major Hall, Major Dennison, Surgeon-Major Wilson, Captain
Porter, and Dr. Thomas D. Johnson.

Rumors of the impending dismissal

of the American officers flourished but only Colonel Field and Major
Martin actually received their discharges in 1877. 87
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The depth of Stone's respect for the Khedive can be seen in the
following excerpts from a letter to General Sherman. Sherman Papers,
vol. 50, Stone to Sherman, June 27, 1879. "His Highness the Khedive has

fallen, as you already know, doubtless, by telegram.

I write with

sorrow in my heart, for by this foul act the combined powers of Europe
have cast down the ablest and best ruler which the East has had since
Muhannnad Ali. • • So the sovereign I have loved to serve and who had
done so much for Egypt passes into history where hes works will make
him appear far higher and nobler than the sovereigns and statesmen who
have accomplished his overthrow • • • "
87The Derrick Letters, #13, March 30, 1877.

122

With the circumstances surrounding the Azooricans as difficult as
they were, it was no wonder that many of the officers viewed -Stone in
a negative light.

His continuing support of Ismail and his' government ':

of pashas throughout the Egyptian financial crisis must have seemed like
a sellout to the remnants of the American mission who had worked so hard
to bring their modern, western ways to Egypt.

These men were now worried

about their future plans and their back pay while Stone continued to
socialize with the pashas.

In their eyes, Stone was acting more like

a traditional pasha with each passing day, secure in his position of
patronage and blind to the world around him.
Stone still saw in the

Khediv~

The American idealism that

was lost upon the rest of the American

officers.
The final discharges did not come until June 30, 1878,

Without

official warning, although the men had been expecting it for over a
year, the remainder of the American officers were unceremoniously dismissed from the Egyptian service.

The European controlled Connnission

of Inquiry, charged with the duty of cutting the Egyptian expenditures
needed no encouragement to begin the economies with the dismissal of the
foreign staff officers, who for the most part were American.

General

Stone was excluded from this order at the insistence of Ismail who
still had faith in the loyalty and many abilities of his Chief of Staff.
In short order the abolition of the few remaining vestiges of the
American presence followed.

The Staff College, the artillery school,
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the submarine school, the engineering school, the battalion school, and
the children's school were eliminated to conserve the European bondholders
money.

88

The funding for the Printing Office established by General

Stone was also halted, however it was able to continue with the revenue
its publications generated.

Thus the American mission disappeared in

1878 even more quickly that it had been established in 1870.
The Abyssinian debacle crystallized Khedive Isma.il's precarious
hold on his position as the absolute ruler of Egypt.

He needed his

pashas for support against the European infiltration of his government.
The irregular and evasive habits so characteristic of the traditional
pashas in bureaucratic and military positions in the Khedive's government were the only defense Ismail had to combat the thorough audit
proposed by the British and French.

These were the very traits the

American officers had tried to modify.

Ismail had no choice but to

turn his back to the entire philosophy of the mission.

While this did

not preclude his private appreciation of the individual Americans, this
change in events along with the financial cutbacks, effectively ended
the unofficial American mission to Egypt.

88Hesseltine, p. 249.
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CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSION

With the dismissal of the American officers from the Egyptian army
in 1878, one of the earliest and most comprehensive

experi~nts

of sharing

American military technology and organizational principles came to an end.
After almost ten years of concentrated effort, the American officers left
the Egyptian army in virtually the same condition as they had found it.
During that time the American officers, led by General Charles P. Stone,
· designed a staff system for the Egyptian army and they established a series
of specialized schools not only for the staff officers but for the rank
and file as well.

Ho;vever, when these officers were given the opportunity

to prove the effectiveness of their technology and organization in battle,
they failed.

Consequently, this early American attempt at sharing techno-

logy with a developing nation had little noticeable effect upon history.
The American failure to effectively modernize and.reorganize the
Egyptian military system stemmed from three factors.

The most destructive

element was the resistance to change demonstrated by the traditional military elite of Egypt, the pashas.

At issue here was not so much the tech-

nology offered by the Americans, but the cultural by-products of the American reorganization.

Hundreds of years of traditional and religious pre-
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rogatives were at stake, and the Turkish and Circassian officers felt that
there was little to gain in such a comprehensive overhaul of their system.
The American insensitivity to the cultural. issues only strenghthened the
pashas 1 resistance.

Without the cooperation of the military elite, the

American reforms had a minimal effect upon the Egyptian military system.
The European objections to the American presence and their ultimate
control of Egyptian finances proved to be the second insurmountable factor in the failure of the American mission.

While the British and the

French govern.manta were not calling for the dismissal of the American
officers on a daily basis, they certainly indicated their displeasure with
Ismail's choice of independent military advisors.

The need for a secure

hold on Egyp.t increased as the British and French interests in Egypt expanded and as the stability of the Egyptian financial situation deteriorated.

American support for the Egyptian government, however unofficial

and limited, was unwelcome.

Consequently, when Ismail lost the control

of his treasury, the American mission was doomed to dismissal.
Ismail's continued vacillation between the pashas and the American
officers under the ever present pressure from the European bondholders
constituted the third reason for the American failure in this experiment.
On

the one hand, the Khedive believed in and encouraged the methods and

goals of his An:erican officers, yet on the other

ban~,

recognize the consequences of the American proposals.

he did not always
In the early

years of the mission, Ismail tended to support the AtIErican projects
ag_ainst the collective will of his pashas.

However, as the European
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financial encroachment reached the critical stage, Ismail turned to his
native pashas as his last line of defense.

The American effectiveness

declined with their influence, thus insuring their ·final dismissal from

the Egyptian army.
Although they failed.in the larger cultural and political sphere
of

~heir

mission, their technology prevailed wherever the Americans were

given a free reign.

The refortifications, roads, canals, dams, and

light houses would remain in.Egypt, the Sudan, and Ethiopia as a testament to the American engineering capacity.

The territorial maps, the

hydrological maps, and the geological assay reports that resulted from
the various exploration assignments brought the study of the African
continent into new heights of scientific precision.

In spite of the

cultural difficulties, as technicians, the Americans performed admirably.
An assessment. of the American mission's effect upon Egyptian
history would not be complete without raising one further question.

Did

the educational programs established by the American officers have any
effect upon the Egyptian military?

While recognizing that there was

substantial disapproval by the traditional military elites to the various
schools and that the schools were in operation for only six to eight
years thus limiting their impact, does not totally preclude the possibility that the Americans did influence some of their students.

The

young Egyptian officers who were not from the traditional military
families might have seen much to gain from the American programs.

Unfor-

.tunately, speculation had now taken the place of concrete, available
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sources.

However, if one follows this line of thought, some interesting

coincidences in subsequent Egyptian history take on a less random appearance.

Approximately four years after the dismissal of the American mission
a full-scale Egyptian military uprising took place, known as the Arabi
rebellion.

The leader, Colonel Ahmed Arabi was an Egyptian soldier who

had risen to the rank of Lieutenant Colonel during the reign of Isma.il's
predecessor, Said Pasha.

Because of his high rank, it is unlikely that

he attended any of the American staffed schools, however it is documented
that Colonel Arabi dealt with the American officers on a number of
occasions.

1

Two specific details of the uprising suggest that Arabi

had been influenced by the Americans.
In the first case, Colonel Arabi had accurate knowledge of the
torpedo mines that were laid
Alexandria harbor.

2

by the Americans some ten years earlier in

His efforts to secure the detonator device were

foiled, but had he succeeded, the bombardment of the Alexandria harbor
by the British and the French might have never occurred.

The second

detail concerns Arabi's last stand against the British at Tel-el-Kebir.
General Stone conceived that very strategy in 1871.

Unfortunately,

· 1James M. Morgan, Recollections of a Rebel Reefer (Boston:
Houghton Mifflin Co., 1917), pp. 290-292.
2

Baron de Kusel, An Englishman's Recollections of Egypt 1863-1887
(London: John Lane, The Bodley Head, 1914), pp. 150-151.
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Arabi failed to follow Stone's defense plan to the letter.

By not

fortifying Tel-el-Kebir and Zagazig (in the rear) as Stone suggested,
Arabi left his army unprotected in the flat Delta against the advancing_

British troops.

Consequently the rebellion was crushed.

3

In both instances, the leftover American influence comes more
as "what could have been" rather than what was actually achieved.
That might be called the theme of the American's efforts in Egypt.

3samuel H. Lockett, "Arabi and His Army," The Nation, 35(September
28, 1882), p. 258.
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APPENDIX l

ROSTER OF THE UNOFFICIAL AMERICAN MISSION TO EGYPT

*

Vanderbilt Allen (West Point, Class of 1864)
1870: Arrived in Egypt
1872: Resigned

*

James Bassel (West Point, Class of 1867)
1874: Arrived in Egypt
Resigned

+William P. A. Campbell
1870: Arrived in Egypt
1874: Died in Khartoum, October 10

*

Charles Chaille-Long
1870: Arrived in Egypt
18 77: Resigned

+ Raleigh E. Colston
1873: Arrived in Egypt
1878: Discharged
Captain Coppinger
1875: Arrived in Egypt
1875: Resigned

* Ja~s

A. Dennison (West Point, Class of 1870)
1875: Arrived in Egypt
1876: Left Egypt, December 31

+ Henry C. Derrick
1875: Arrived in Egypt
1878: Discharged
+William w. Dunlap
1871: Arrived in Egypt
No record of departure
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APPENDIX 1, continued

*William McE. Dye (West Point, Class of 1853)
1873: Arrived in Egypt
1878: Discharged

* Eugene

Oscar Fechet (West Point, Class of 1868)
1872: Arrived in Egypt
1874: Left Egypt, February 14

+ Charles W. Field (West Point, Class of 1849)
1875:
1877:

Arrived in Egypt
Discharged

+ Charles I. Graves
1875:
1878:
~

.... -·

Arrived in Egypt
Discharged

+ Wilburn B. Hall
1874:
1877:

Arrived in Egypt
Resigned

+ Cornelius Hunt
1870:
· 1873:

Arrived in Egypt
Died in Alexandria, February 28

* Henry

Irgins
1876: Arrived in Egypt
1878: Discharged, died in Liverpool enroute to U.S.

+ Walter H. Jenifer
1870:
1871:

Arrived in Egypt
Resigned

+ Thomas D. Johnson
1875:
1877:

Arrived in Egypt
Resigned

+ Beverly Kennon, Jr.
1870: Arrived in Egypt
1874: Resigned
Robert s. Lamson
1875: Arrived in Egypt
1876: Died in Darfur, November

142

APPENDIX 1, continued

+ Samuel H. Lockett (West Point, Class of 1859)
1875: Arrived in Egypt
1877: Resigned
+William W. Loring
1870: Arrived in Egypt
1878: Discharged
* Charles F. Loshe
1875: Arrived in Egypt
1878: Died in Suakin, October
Harry Mcivor
1870: Arrived in Egypt
No record of departure
* Chancellor Martin (West Point, Class of 1868)
1874: Arrived in Egypt
1877: Resigned
+ Alexander McComb Mason (Appointed to Annapolis 1861, resigned
to enter the Confederate service)
1870: Arrived in Egypt
1878: Discharged
+ James M. Morgan (Annapolis)
1870: Arrived in Egypt
1872: Resigned
.*Thaddeus P. Mott
1869: Arrived in Egypt
.1875: Retired to Turkey

* Edmund

Parys
1871: Arrived in Egypt
1874: Died in Egypt, April 13

* David

E. Porter
1875: Arrived in Egypt
1876: Resigned
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*

Henry C. Prout·
1872: Arrived in Egypt
1878: Discharged

* Erastus

Sparrow Purdy
1870: Arrived in Egypt
1878: Discharged,·died in Cairo (as a civilian employee of the
Khedive) June 21, 1881.

* Horatio B. Reed
1874: Arrived in Egypt
1875: Sick leave to U.S.
+Alexander W. Reynolds (West Point, Class of 1838)
1870: Arrived in Egypt
18 76: Died in Alexandria, May 26.
+Frank A. Reynolds (West Point, Class of 1861)
1870: Arrived in Egypt
1875: Died· in Illion, New York still in the Egyptian service
+ Thomas G. Rhett {West Point, Class of 1845)
1870: Arrived in Egypt
1875: Resigned

*

Robert M. Rogers {West Point, Class of 1867)
1874: Arrived in Egypt
~
1875: Resigned

*Richard Savage (West Point, Class of 1868)
1872: Arrived in Egypt
1872: Returned in same summer
+Henry H. Sibley (West Point, Class of 1838)
1870: Arrived in Egypt
1873: Discharged due to illness

*

Charles Pomeroy Stone (West Point, Class of 1845)
1870: Arrived in Egypt
1883: Resigned

*Washington Carroll Tevis (West Point, Class of 1849)
18 72: Arrived in Egypt
1873: Resigned
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+ William H. Ward
1871:
1878:

Arrived in Egypt
Discharged

+ Edward Warren
1873: Arrived in Egypt
1876: Discharged
+ D. G. White
18 75: Arrived in Egypt
1876: Deserted, December

* William

H. Wilson
1875: Arrived in Egypt
1877: Resigned

Symbols:

*

Union Army

+ Confederate Army
No symbol indicates no Civil War record
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